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OF ATKINS AND MEN*: DEVIATIONS FROM
CLINICAL DEFINITIONS OF MENTAL
RETARDATION IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES
John H. Blume,** Sheri Lynn Johnson*** & Christopher Seeds****
Under Atkins v. Virginia, the Eighth Amendment exempts from exe-
cution individuals who meet the clinical definitions of mental retardation
set forth by the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities and the American Psychiatric Association. Both define
mental retardation as significantly subaverage intellectual functioning
accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning, originat-
ing before the age of 18. Since Atkins, most jurisdictions have adopted
definitions of mental retardation that conform to those definitions. But
some states, looking often to stereotypes of persons with mental retarda-
tion, apply exclusion criteria that deviate from and are more restrictive
than the accepted scientific and clinical definitions. These state devia-
tions have the effect of excluding from Atkins's reach some individuals
who plainly fall within the class it protects. This article focuses on the
cases of Roger Cherry, Jeffrey Williams, Michael Stallings, and others,
who represent an ever-growing number of individuals inappropriately
excluded from Atkins. Left unaddressed, the state deviations discussed
herein permit what Atkins does not: the death-sentencing and execution
of some capital defendants who have mental retardation.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2002, following a consistent wave of state legislative action
prohibiting the use of the death penalty on defendants with mental retar-
dation, the Supreme Court overruled its thirteen-year-old decision in
Penry v. Lynaugh,1 and declared a categorical exemption from the death
penalty for defendants who have mental retardation. 2 In doing so, the
Court recognized that defendants with mental retardation are less culpa-
ble because they have diminished capacities to understand and process
information, to communicate, to learn from mistakes and experience, to
engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the
reactions of others.3 The Court defined the exemption by embracing two
clinical definitions-one provided by the American Association on
Mental Retardation (AAMR) (now the American Association on Intellec-
tual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD)) 4 and the other by the
1 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
2 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
3 See id. at 318.
4 The clinical field increasingly employs the term "intellectual disability." We refer to
"mental retardation," since Atkins used that term. See Robert L. Schalock et al., The Renaming
of Mental Retardation: Understanding the Change to the Term Intellectual Disability, 45 IN-
TELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILrEs 116 (2007) (explaining that change in terminology
within AAIDD involves no change in definition).
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American Psychiatric Association in its Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR). 5 State measures for ascertaining
mental retardation in capital cases, the Court suggested, would be "ap-
propriate"-or "constitutional"-so long as they "generally conformed"
to these clinical definitions.6 Thus, under Atkins v. Virginia, the Eighth
Amendment protects individuals who meet the AAIDD/AAMR criteria
for mental retardation or the virtually identical criteria of the DSM-IV-
TR.
The three-part clinical definitions set forth by the AAIDD and
DSM-IV-TR define mental retardation as significantly subaverage intel-
lectual functioning accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive
functioning, originating before the age of 18. 7 Since Atkins, most juris-
dictions have adopted definitions of mental retardation that conform to
those definitions. Some states, however, have taken Atkins's statement
that lower courts and state legislatures may define their own procedural
rules to "enforce the constitutional restriction,"8 as license to apply meth-
ods that deviate from and are more restrictive than the accepted scientific
and clinical definitions. Some of these states, such as Texas, are among
those that the Court identified as holdouts to the national consensus in
Atkins.9 These deviations have the effect of excluding from Atkins's
reach some individuals who plainly fall within the class it protects-
5 Id. at 308 n.3 (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATIS-
TICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]; AAMR,
MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed.
1992) [hereinafter AAMR 9th ed.]). The AAMR 1992 definition has since been redrafted in a
2002 revision but is substantially the same. See AAMR, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 13, 14, 17, 58 (10th ed. 2002) [hereinafter
AAMR 10th ed.]; see also AAIDD, USER'S GUIDE: MENTAL RETARDATION DEFINITION, CLAS-
SIFICATION AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 12 (10th ed. 2007) [hereinafter AAIDD 10th ed.].
6 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 n.22 (noting that "[t]he statutory definitions of mental
retardation are not identical, but generally conform to the clinical definitions .... ").
7 The clinical definitions of mental retardation approved in Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3,
provide:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is char-
acterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently
with related limitations in one or more of the following applicable adaptive skill
areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-di-
rection, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retarda-
tion manifests before age 18. AAMR 9th ed., supra note 5, at 1.
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general intel-
lectual functioning . . . that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive
functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care,
home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction,
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety . . . . DSM-IV-TR,
supra note 5, at 41.
8 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416-17
(1986)).
9 See id. at 316 n.20.
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persons whom no reasonable clinician would exclude from a pool of sub-
jects with mental retardation.
In Cherry v. Florida, for example, the state argued that the defen-
dant's IQ score of 72 disqualified him under Atkins's intellectual func-
tioning requirement because the Florida statute refers to an IQ score of
"70 or below." Cherry argued that, applying the statistical concept of the
standard error of measurement, his score should be considered to be
within a range of scores from 67 to 77. The court ignored statistics,
imposed a cutoff of 70, and dismissed Cherry's Atkins claim, without
considering adaptive functioning or onset. 10 According to the scientific
and clinical definitions of mental retardation, however, Roger Cherry's
IQ score did not defeat his Atkins claim. Contrary to the Florida courts'
rulings, the definitions recognized in Atkins entitled Cherry to a fair as-
sessment of adaptive functioning.
In Williams v. Quarterman, the petitioner, who had a full-scale IQ
score of 70, faced a different problem. Denying Williams's Atkins claim,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit interpreted evi-
dence of social and practical skill deficits-including poor hygiene,
homelessness, and the inability to live on his own, cook, hold a job, dress
appropriately for weather, or follow the rules of games in school-as
"bizarre and antisocial conduct," evincing characteristics that "are just as
easily seen as attention-getting behaviors as they are evidence of mental
retardation," traits that "could be explained by anti-social personality
rather than mental retardation."'11 Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's opinion,
the scientific and clinical definitions emphasize that individuals with
mental retardation often have mental disorders as well. No reasonable
clinician would have determined that Jeffrey Williams did not have
mental retardation merely because the evidence also supported a diagno-
sis of antisocial personality disorder.
In State v. Stallings, Ohio courts accepted that Michael Stallings had
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning as well as significant
limitations in adaptive functioning, but nevertheless rejected his Atkins
claim because no defense expert could "definitely conclude" that onset of
these impairments occurred before the age of 18; the experts testified
only that mental retardation could not be ruled out.' 2 In federal habeas
review, the district court questioned whether the state court's demand for
a standardized test score pre-dating Stallings's eighteenth birthday ex-
ceeded what Atkins requires, imposing in effect an "impossible burden"
of proof on a petitioner not tested as a child or adolescent. Nevertheless,
10 See Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702 (Fla. 2007).
11 Williams v. Quarterman, 293 Fed. Appx. 298, 312 (5th Cir. 2008).
12 See State v. Stallings, No. CR 1997 05 1118(A), 2004 WL 5457509, at *11-12 (Ohio
Ct. Com. P1. Jan. 16, 2004).
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the court "reluctantly" affirmed, concluding that the state court's prereq-
uisite, if novel, was not unreasonable. 13
The constitutional concerns these divergent approaches raise are
readily apparent. This troubling array allows a defendant who would be
ineligible for execution in one state to be eligible for execution in an-
other. 14 This state of affairs, in which factually similar Atkins claims
generate different results by jurisdiction, is intolerable under the Eighth
Amendment, which demands consistency and non-arbitrary application
of punishment.
Atkins's directive is straightforward. In applying the Court's man-
date, states, while free to establish procedural rules, must adhere in sub-
stance to the scientific and clinical definitions of mental retardation set
forth by the AAIDD and the DSM-IV-TR. Leaving "to the State[s] the
task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restric-
tion upon [their] execution of sentences,"' 5 the Court gave states author-
ity over the procedures used to implement the categorical exemption,
such as whether determinations of mental retardation should be made by
a judge or by a jury, whether determinations should occur before or after
guilt-innocence trials, which party bears the burden of proof, and what
entitles a mental retardation claim to an evidentiary hearing or bars it by
procedural default. 16 The Court also anticipated case-by-case dispute
over the fact-intensive determination of whether a particular defendant
13 See Stallings v. Bagley, 561 F. Supp. 2d 821, 885-86 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (applying 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000)).
14 See, e.g., Dennis R. Olvera et al., Mental Retardation and Sentences for Murder:
Comparison of Two Recent Court Cases, 38 MENTAL RETARDATION 228, 231 (2000) (finding
that in factually similar cases, different courts reached different results). Professor Weithorn
also observes:
[A]s the comparison between Florida's and California's use of standardized IQ tests
suggests, there are noteworthy inconsistencies in the ways in which state courts are
using these tests. This result is disturbing in light of the dramatic real-world conse-
quences of the application of these tests in the Atkins context. A defendant with Full
Scale IQ scores ranging from 68 to 86 was determined to be eligible for the death
penalty in Florida, while a defendant with Full Scale scores of 81 to 96 was found to
be ineligible in California.
Lois A. Weithorn, Conceptual Hurdles to the Application of Atkins v. Virginia, 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 1203, 1231 (2008).
15 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399
(1986)).
16 For a general discussion of state procedures for determining mental retardation follow-
ing Atkins, see Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia: Lessons from Sub-
stance and Procedure in the Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 57 DEPAUL L.
REv. 721, 724-30 (2008). See also id. at 731-37 (focusing on the use of procedures to cir-
cumvent the constitutional exemption).
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has mental retardation. 17 But the Court did not give states license to
narrow the class of persons who fall within the constitutional prohibition.
Roger Cherry, Jeffrey Williams, and Michael Stallings represent an
ever-growing number of individuals who are inappropriately excluded
from Atkins's reach based on distortions or novel amendments inconsis-
tent with the scientific and clinical definitions of mental retardation.
These deviations have a significant impact on the adjudication of mental
retardation claims in capital cases. Left unaddressed, they ultimately per-
mit what Atkins does not: the sentencing to death and execution of capital
defendants who have mental retardation.18
I. THE FRAMEWORK: ATKINS AND THE SCIENTIFIC AND
CLINICAL DEFINITIONS
The AAIDD and DSM-IV-TR define mental retardation in three
parts, as a disability characterized by (1) significantly subaverage intel-
lectual functioning; and (2) significant limitations in adaptive behavior or
functioning as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive
skills; (3) originating before the age of 18.19 "Significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning" is most accurately defined not strictly by IQ
scores, but as intellectual performance that is at least two standard devia-
tions below the societal mean.20 An IQ score of around 70 generally
corresponds to such performance. 2' Approximately ninety-seven percent
of all people fall within two standard deviations, or thirty points, of the
mean.22 In other words, the class of individuals with mental retardation
includes less than three percent of the population. Eighty-five percent of
persons with mental retardation-and most capital defendants with
mental retardation-fall in the "mild" classification, the highest level of
functioning to meet the clinical definitions, which "typically . . .de-
scribe[s] people with an IQ level of 50-55 to approximately 70,"23 and in
17 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 ("Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so
impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a
national consensus.").
18 Many issues confronting mental retardation assessments under Atkins mirror ongoing
debate in scientific forums, on issues such as whether certain standardized instruments prop-
erly measure adaptive functioning and whether intelligence should be defined by labeled
groups or by standard deviations below the mean, or even whether "assessment methods used
to evaluate 'mental retardation' in educational and social service settings can be employed in
the death penalty context without modification, reservation, or additional scrutiny." See Wei-
thorn, supra note 14, at 1232. These questions are not the concerns of lower courts under
Atkins and they do not concern us here.
19 See AAMR 10th ed., supra note 5, at 8; DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41.
20 See AAMR 10th ed., supra note 5, at 57-59; DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41-42.
21 See AAMR 10th ed., supra note 5, at 57-59; DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41-42.
22 See AAMR 10th ed., supra note 5, at 57.
23 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n. 3 (quoting DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 42-43).
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terms of mental age is similar intellectually in many ways to an average
ten-year-old, or a fifth or sixth grade student.24
Because most capital defendants with mental retardation fall in this
upper boundary, any factor that introduces unreliability into the proce-
dure and renders a defendant's test score erroneously high is dangerous.
Courts and advocates must therefore be aware that not all IQ tests are
equal, and they must be vigilant to ensure that the tests are scored prop-
erly, 25 are current, and account for standard statistical concepts of mea-
surement error, practice effect, and an effect unique to intelligence
testing known as the Flynn effect.26 These requirements are incorporated
by the AAIDD definition of significantly subaverage intellectual func-
tioning as "[p]erformance that is at least two standard deviations below
the mean of an appropriate assessment instrument, considering the stan-
dard error of measurement for the specific assessment instruments used
and the instruments' strengths and limitations. ' 27 Unfortunately, courts
have failed to uniformly adhere to these requirements, even though the
clinical definitions stress them.
The two clinical definitions of mental retardation recognized in At-
kins also have nearly identical requirements for adaptive functioning. At
the time of Atkins, both clinical definitions required significant limita-
tions in adaptive behavior in two of ten (AAMR) or two of eleven
(DSM-IV-TR) skill areas. After Atkins, the AAMR revised the definition
of adaptive functioning according to three rather than ten skill areas, as
"the collection of conceptual, social, and practical skills that have been
24 See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 42-43.
25 See Hall v. Quarterman, 534 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding state court unreasona-
bly denied Atkins claim in part because the decision was based on a misreading of defendant's
IQ as 72 instead of 67); Lewis v. Quarterman, 541 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding district
court erred in refusing to consider affidavit of the author of Stanford-Binet test stating that the
psychologist who administered the test to the defendant did not follow proper procedures).
26 See James R. Flynn, Massive IQ Gains in 14 Nations: What IQ Tests Really Measure,
101 PsYcH. BULL. 171, 171-91 (1987).
27 AAIDD 10th ed., supra note 5, at 12; AAMR 10th ed., supra note 5, at 13. An
appropriate assessment instrument is an intelligence test that is generally accepted in the field
(the most common are the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-IIl) and the Stanford-
Binet Intelligence Scale (SB5)), is properly normed on a sample that represents the defendant's
age and cultural and linguistic background, and is current. The mean of a properly normed and
current test is generally 100; two standard deviations below that mean is an IQ score of 70.
This is presently true for the WAIS-II and the SB5. For a general discussion of appropriate
intelligence tests, see AAMR 10th ed., supra note 5, at 59-71. See also Richard J. Bonnie &
Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge of Implementing Atkins v. Virginia: How Legislatures
and Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and Adjudications of Mental Retardation in
Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RicH. L. REV. 811, 826-29 (2007) (discussing issues concerning
intelligence testing and establishing the first prong of the clinical definitions of mental retarda-
tion under Atkins). For a discussion of the possibility of means other than 100, and accord-
ingly situations in which two standard deviations below the mean registers as something
higher than 70, see id. at 842-43.
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learned by people in order to function in their everyday lives."' 28 As the
use of multiple skill areas suggests, assessing adaptive functioning defi-
cits is an intensive task that involves taking into account the testimony of
family members, teachers, employers, friends, family, correctional of-
ficers, and more. It is also a sensitive task in which one must look
closely for clients putting on a "cloak of competence"-"passing" as
normal or faking as though they do not have certain deficits-and for
clients "cheating to lose," who would rather die, literally, than be diag-
nosed with mental retardation. The clinical definitions guide this com-
plex assessment with several operational principles. 29 Two of these
principles-that "limitations in present functioning must be considered
within the context of community environments typical of the individual's
age peers and culture" and that "within an individual, limitations often
coexist with strengths"-factor significantly in capital cases. 30
The third criterion for establishing mental retardation under the
clinical definitions is that the functional limitations associated with
mental retardation develop before the subject is eighteen years of age.
Evidence of onset is usually established through a social history investi-
gation, which includes a thorough inventory of school records, medical
records, and interviews with witnesses (most importantly teachers and
school peers) who knew the defendant in the community environment-
including the individual's age peers and culture-in which he or she
grew up.3t The clinical definitions neither specify nor require that onset
be established by a standardized test score. 32
28 See AAMR 10th ed., supra note 5, at 5. The 10th edition of AAMR, which reduced
the important skill areas to three, requires significant limitations in only one area. Id. at 20-23
tbl.2.1 (chronicling historical development of the current definition). The definitions of adap-
tive behavior, while following developments in consensus in the clinical field, have retained a
consistent core meaning. See id.
29 The shift to measuring adaptive functioning by skill areas was "contingent on" several
"assumptions" or principles of application. These are part of the AAMR "application of the
definition" or "operational definition" of mental retardation:
1) Limitations in present functioning must be considered within the context of com-
munity environments typical of the individual's age peers and culture.
2) Valid assessment considers cultural and linguistic diversity as well as differences
in communication, sensory, motor, and behavioral factors.
3) Within an individual, limitations often coexist with strengths.
4) An important purpose of describing limitations is to develop a profile of needed
supports.
5) With appropriate personalized supports over a sustained period, the life function-
ing of the person with mental retardation will generally improve.
id. at 8-9, 13 tbl.l.2.
30 ROBERT L. SCHALOCK & RUTH LUCKASSON, CLUNQCAL JuDGmENT 39 (2005); see
AAMR 10th ed., supra note 5, at 8; DSM-TR-IV, supra note 5, at 42, 47.
31 See AAIDD 10th ed., supra note 5, at 18-22.
32 See Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 27, at 855.
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Overall, none of the diagnostic criteria for mental retardation "in-
clude an exclusion criterion. ' 33 This is because of the well-accepted un-
derstanding that individuals with mental retardation possess a wide
variety of "abilities and needs."'34 Some individuals with IQ scores be-
tween 70 and 75 have mental retardation, while others, lacking signifi-
cant deficits in adaptive functioning, do not. Some individuals with
mental retardation suffer from a concurrent mental disorder; others do
not. Some individuals, due in part to social and cultural factors, have
taken standardized intelligence or adaptive behavior tests before the age
of eighteen, while others have not. Because all individuals with mental
retardation are unique, the clinical definitions eschew exclusion criteria.
Since Atkins, however, a few state and federal courts have nevertheless
applied exclusion criteria, often looking to stereotypes. In these determi-
nations of mental retardation, the science-the "standards of measure-
ment, assessment, and diagnosis at the center of Atkins adjudications"-
has been betrayed.35
II. ROGER CHERRY AND OTHERS EXCLUDED FROM ATKINS'S REACH
DESPITE QUALIFYING IQ SCORES
For Roger Cherry, the issue on appeal was whether he could satisfy
the first prong of the definition of mental retardation with an IQ test
score of 72. The Florida statute referred only to an IQ score of "70 or
below," and because of this, the state court determined a strict cutoff
should apply instead of the standard error of measurement. Without con-
sidering adaptive functioning, the court ruled that Cherry did not have
mental retardation based on his IQ score. 36 Cherry illustrates a recurring
problem after Atkins: the failure of courts to apply the standard error of
measurement and other practice effects to all IQ scores.
A. The Accepted Understanding of Significantly Subaverage
Intellectual Functioning Applies Standard Measurement Error
and Other Practice Effects to All IQ Scores
When the Court recognized in Atkins that "'mild' mental retarda-
tion... typically describes people with an IQ level of 50-55 to approxi-
33 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 47.
34 City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985).
35 See Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 27, at 816 ("At the very least, the Court must
have assumed that expert disagreements would rest on articulable differences in scientific or
clinical judgment, rather than on hidden disagreements about whether the offender deserves a
death sentence. In this sense, the very soundness of the Atkins decision, and the integrity of
Atkins adjudications, turns on the effort made by the states to implement it in a scientifically
satisfactory manner.") (focusing on Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-264.3:1.1-1.2 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
36 See Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702 (Fla. 2007).
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mately 70,"37 the word "approximately" was important. It refers to the
standard error of measurement and other known phenomena, such as the
practice effect, that impact accurate interpretation of intellectual test
scores. "Because all measurement, and particularly psychological mea-
surement, has some potential for error, obtained scores may actually re-
present a range of several points."'38 This error can obtain from the
behavior of the tester or the manner in which the tester provides the test,
the environment in which the test is taken and its immediate effect during
the test upon the subject, or other factors, such as the properties of the
test instrument. 39 The concept of the Standard Error of Measurement
(SEM) accounts for the threat error poses to test-score reliability. It "de-
scribes the band of error surrounding an individual's theoretical 'true'
score on that test" and "estimates the standard deviation of an individ-
ual's scores on a test if that person could be tested a large number of
times, and effects such as practice and fatigue could be ruled out.' '40 On
up to date and well-standardized tests, the SEM is between three to five
points.41 Accordingly, both clinical definitions include measurement er-
ror in the definition of intellectual functioning:
37 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.3 (2002) (quoting DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5,
at 42-43) (emphasis added).
38 AAMR 10th ed., supra note 5, at 12.
39 See James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penally: A Guide to State
Legislative Issues, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11, 13 (2003) ("As much as
the criminal justice system might prefer to have a hard-and-fast limitation measureable by a
single IQ score, it is simply impossible to exclude consideration of other factors about the
testing performed on the individual, or to ignore the need for clinical judgment by experienced
diagnosticians."). Scoring errors are also a prominent problem. See, e.g., Joseph J. Ryan,
Scoring Reliability on the WAIS-R, 51 J. CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 149, 149
(1983). Ryan's study asked 19 psychologists and 20 graduate students to score two completed
WAIS-R protocols. The study obtained significantly different results, which demonstrated that
"scoring error has a significant impact on the accuracy of WAIS-R summary scores ....
Inspection of the individual protocols by the authors revealed that IQ variability resulted from
mechanical errors in scoring, such as incorrectly converting scaled scores to IQs, giving incor-
rect credit to individual items, and calculation errors in adding raw scores of subtests." Id. He
concluded that this lack of scoring precision, along with "other sources of unreliability that are
known to influence performance, such as test administration, examiner-examinee characteris-
tics, and the psychometric properties of the instrument... underscore[ ] the need to report IQ
values in conjunction with a precision range based on the standard error of measurement of the
test." Id.
40 DAVID WECHSLER, WAIS-R MANUAL: WECHSLER ADULT INTELLIGENCE SCALE - RE-
VISED 31 (1981); see THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CORPORATION, WAIS-IH - WMS-III TECHNICAL
MANUAL 53 (1997) [hereinafter WAIS-III] ("The standard error of measurement is used to
calculate the confidence interval, or the band of scores, around the observed score in which the
individual's true score is likely to fall .... The examiner can use confidence intervals to report
an individual's score as an interval that is likely to contain the individual's true score. Confi-
dence intervals also serve as a reminder that measurement error is inherent in all test scores
and that the observed test score is only an estimate of true ability.").
41 See J. P. GUILFORD, PSYCHOMETRIC METHODS 352 (2d ed. 1954) (1936). Guilford
notes that with the SEM, "[fnor any given obtained score, then, we can draw conclusions
concerning the probable limits of corresponding true scores." Id. Where the SEM of a test is
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Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning is de-
fined as an IQ of about 70 or below .... It should be
noted that there is a measurement error of approximately
5 points in assessing IQ, although this may vary from
instrument to instrument (e.g., a Wechsler IQ of 70 is
considered to represent a range of 65-75). Thus it is pos-
sible to diagnose Mental Retardation in individuals with
IQs between 70 and 75 who exhibit significant deficits
in adaptive behavior.42
Therefore, according to the AAIDD, "[i]t is clear that neither of [the
clinical definitions] intends for a fixed cutoff point for making the diag-
nosis of mental retardation."'43 The Court recognized the same in Atkins,
noting that "[ilt is estimated that between 1 and 3 percent of the popula-
tion has an IQ between 70 and 75, which is typically considered the
cutoff IQ score for the intellectual functioning prong of the mental retar-
dation definition." 44 The bottom line is that a person can have an IQ
score (or scores) over 70-and as high as 75-and still have mental re-
tardation.45 This is universally recognized in clinical practice, 46 as legal
X, "[w]e may say that for any particular true score the odds are 2 to 1 that the obtained score
will not deviate more that one [XI from it." Id. at 389. "A departure of [2X] from the true
score would be expected in one case in about twenty." Id. See Joy PAUL GUILFORD, FUNDA-
MENTAL STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION 337 (6th ed. 1978) (1942) (noting that
using a SEM enables scientific investigators to "say something definite concerning how trust-
worthy [their] predictions are-about how much error one should expect in the phenomenon
predicted"); HENRY E. GARRETr, STATSTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION 290 (6th ed.
1966) (1926) (stating SEM measurements "enable[ ] us to estimate the probable divergences of
an obtained score on a test from its corresponding true score"); FREDERIC M. LORD & MELVIN
R. NovICK, STATISTICAL THEORIES OF MENTAL TEST SCORES 66-67 (1968) (explaining that the
standard error of measurement is "a measure of the discrepancy between the estimate and the
actual value of the true score" that illustrates "the relative magnitude of these errors").
42 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41-42; see AAMR 9th ed., supra note 5, at 28 (defining
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning as "approximately 70 to 75 or below"). The
AAMR 10th edition adjusted this language in response to confusion over whether a 75 IQ
score would also be subject to an SEM range, but the definition did not change. See AAMR
10th ed., supra note 5, at 24.
43 AAMR 10th ed., supra note 5, at 58.
44 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.5 (2002).
45 The integral nature of the SEM as a reliability measure to the intelligence prong of
mental retardation diagnosis and classification is also exemplified by the 1992 AAMR defini-
tion of significantly subaverage intellectual functioning as "approximately 70 to 75 or below."
AAMR 9th ed., supra note 5, at 28. As the 2002 Manual explains, this definition explicitly
applied the standard error of measurement in the definition rather than stating it, as the current
definition does. The 2002 manual explains that "[b]y defining significantly subaverage intel-
lectual functioning as 'approximately 70 to 75 or below,' the authors of the manual intended to
provide increased clarity, but not to change the cutoff." AAMR 10th ed., supra note 5, at 24.
46 See WAIS-m, supra note 40 (describing the standard error of measurement as one of
the "psychometric properties that are critical for the interpretation of scores").
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commentators have noted. 47
Two other phenomena that occur in IQ testing are widely recog-
nized as scientifically legitimate and must be taken into account to obtain
a reliable score. One of these is the practice effect. Taking an IQ test
more than once during a short period of time-within six to twelve
months-may result in an artificially high score.48 As the AAIDD ex-
plains, "[p]ractice effect gains occur even when the examinee has not
been given any feedback on his performance. '49 Effects are measured
according to each IQ test, and the WAIS-II manual notes an increase of
approximately five points when the test is given more than once within a
period of two to twelve weeks. 50 Therefore, a score on the WAIS-HII of
75 with a strong practice effect could mask a "true" IQ score of 70.
Plainly, taking the practice effect into account could make the difference
between a mental retardation (MR) or non-MR diagnosis. Accordingly,
the AAIDD warns that "clinicians need to be sensitive to these practice
effects and best practices in intellectual assessment recommendations
against administering the same intelligence test to someone within the
same year." 5 1 Consequently, when looking at multiple IQ scores, it is
imperative to know how the tests stand in relationship to one another in
time.
A second clinically recognized effect in IQ test measurement is
known as the Flynn effect. The Flynn effect identifies the gradual in-
crease of IQ scores on a particular instrument over time.5 2 James Flynn,
after whom the effect is named, has recognized different quantums of
effect in different countries. 5 3 For the United States, Flynn has measured
that overall IQ scores rise at a rate of 3 points every 10 years, or a rate of
0.33 points per year since the test was normed or renormed.5 4 Thus,
47 See, e.g., David DeMatteo et al., A National Survey of State Legislation Defining
Mental Retardation: Implications for Policy and Practice After Atkins, 25 BEHAV. Sci. LAW
781, 791 (2007) (arguing against using cut-offs when measuring intellectual functioning and
noting that "the most commonly used measures of intellectual functioning have a five-point
measurement error, which means that an IQ measured at 75 may actually be as low as 70");
John M. Fabian, Life, Death, and IQ; It's Much More Than Just a Score: The Dilemma of the
Mentally Retarded on Death Row, 5(4) J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 1, 7 (2005) (recognizing that the
AAMR criteria require consideration of a 5 point standard error of measurement). See Bonnie
& Gustafson, supra note 27, at 836 ("[T]he SEM must always be taken into account when
interpreting scores on IQ tests; failing to do so would be a clear departure from accepted
professional practice in scoring and interpreting any kind of psychological test, including IQ
tests.")
48 AAIDD 10th ed., supra note 5, at 21; WAIS-Ill, supra note 40, at 56-57.
49 AAIDD, supra note 5, at 21.
50 WAIS-III, supra note 40, at 56-57.
51 AAIDD, supra note 5, at 21.
52 See Flynn, supra note 26.
53 See id.
54 See James Flynn, The Mean IQ of Americans: Massive Gains 1932 to 1978, 95 PSYCH.
BULL. 29 (1984).
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depending on the length of time a test has been in effect-due to rising
IQ scores-the test mean will often be higher than 100. As the AAIDD
notes, a WAIS-III test normed in 1995 with a mean of 100 would have a
mean of 103 in 2005, ten years later.55 Accordingly, a score of two stan-
dard deviations below the mean would be higher than 70-it would be
73. It is for this reason that IQ tests are periodically renormed, thereby
muting the Flynn effect.
Due to the Flynn effect, IQ scores must be adjusted to take into
account when the IQ test was taken in relation to when the test was
renormed. As with the practice effect, failure to take the Flynn effect
into account results in an artificially high IQ score. When looking at any
IQ score, therefore, it is imperative to know when the test was issued and
when it was renormed. The AAIDD recognizes the Flynn effect and the
practice effect as necessary for reliability, particularly when conducting
retrospective diagnoses, those "when the individual with mental retarda-
tion did not receive an official diagnosis of mental retardation during the
developmental period."'56 Many courts have held that the Flynn effect
must be accounted for.57 But others have erroneously dismissed the
Flynn effect as an "unexamined scientific concept,' 58 or as a concept that
is only used in capital litigation. 59 The importance that the AAIDD
places upon the Flynn effect and practice effect in assessing the first
criterion for mental retardation, however, shows otherwise.
B. Some Jurisdictions Ignore the Fundamental Role of the SEM and
Practice Effect in IQ Assessment
The Florida court in Cherry justified enforcing a bright-line cutoff
at a full-scale IQ score of 70 by distinguishing the clinical definitions,
which expressly allow for scores over 70, from a less explicit state rule.60
This is one of several ways in which courts since Atkins have failed to
account for the standard error of measurement in measuring IQ and re-
futed the clinical definitions.61 A second errant approach dismisses the
55 See AAIDD, supra note 5, at 21.
56 Id. at 17.
57 See, e.g., Walker v. True, 399 F.3d 315, 322 (4th Cir. 2005).
58 See Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
59 See Ledford v. Head, No. 1:02-CV-1515-JEC, 2008 WL 754486, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Mar.
19, 2008); Green v. Johnson, 515 F.3d 290, 300 n.2 (4th Cir. 2008).
60 See Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702 (Fla. 2007); see also Jones v. State, 966 So.2d 319,
329 (Fla. 2007) ("Under the plain language of the statute, 'significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning' correlates with an IQ of 70 or below.").
61 See Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 374-75, 388 (Ky. 2005) (noting that
"Atkins did not discuss margins of error" and interpreting statute defining "significantly subav-
erage general intellectual functioning" as "an intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of seventy (70) or
below" to impose a "bright line cutoff' at 70); Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450, 457 (Tenn.
2004) (interpreting statute demanding "significantly subaverage general intellectual function-
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standard error of measurement if a subject tests in a similar range on two
or more tests within a short period of time. In Texas, Jose Garcia
Briseno presented full-scale IQ scores of 72 and 74 on the WAIS-IlI
from examinations administered approximately one year apart. The de-
fense's expert asserted that, taking the SEM associated with the WAIS-
III into account, a score as high as 75 could suffice to meet the intellec-
tual functioning prong. The State's psychologist testified that the SEM
did not apply because there were two proximate test IQ scores on the
WAIS-II within a year. Although the State's psychologist cited no
source supporting this conclusion, the state courts adopted his position.62
However, two proximate scores on the same test within a short period of
time do not increase confidence in the result, and the SEM does not cor-
respondingly diminish. Because the SEM exists uniquely in every test
circumstance, it does not dissipate simply because several IQ tests are
given. 63
Further, some courts correctly recognize that the SEM and IQ pro-
duce a range rather than a number, but nevertheless dismiss downward
adjustment as "speculative" because the SEM could as likely increase as
decrease the IQ score. 64 This perspective was summed up by the district
court in Briseno, which, in affirming the state court's determination, ob-
served that "[b]ecause measurement error could as easily raise a peti-
ing as evidenced by a functional intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of seventy or below" to impose a
"bright line" cutoff at 70); see also Green, 515 F.3d at 300 n.2 ("[N]either Atkins nor Virginia
law appears to require expressly that [SEM] be accounted for in determining mental retarda-
tion status."); Richard J. Bonnie, The American Psychiatric Association's Resource Document
on Mental Retardation and Capital Sentencing: Implementing Atkins v. Virginia, 32 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 304, 305-06 (2004) (stating that the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion's Council on Psychiatry and Law takes the position that "incorporation of a specific cutoff
score is inappropriate, not only because different tests have different scoring norms, but also
because designating a specific score ignores the standard error of measurement and attributes
greater precision to these measures than they can support"); Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note
27, at 844 ("[A] cut-off score for intellectual functioning would only be plausible if it were
defined as 70 or below on a specific test with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15 and
if it incorporated some way of taking individualized factors such as the Flynn effect and prac-
tice effects into account. This is not an advisable approach."); cf. State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d
1011, 1014 (Ohio 2002) (applying rebuttable presumption that defendant is not mentally re-
tarded if IQ is over 70).
62 See Briseno v. Dretke, No. L-05-08, 2007 WL 998743, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29,
2007) (quoting State Habeas Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 2); accord
Ledford, 2008 WL 754486, at *8 (finding 77 FSIQ on WAIS-R in 1992 and 79 FSIQ on
WAIS-III in 2007 "corroborate each other," and thus reduce the likely impact of the standard
error of measurement).
63 A letter by the author of a chapter on the WAIS-Ill devoted to serial testing of IQ
scores, submitted to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals by Briseno's attorneys, offered the
proper clinical approach: "[Briseno's] second test score of 74 is consistent with his initial
score of 72, and his estimated true IQ score is 95 times out of 100 likely to fall within the
range of 67-79." CLINICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE WAIS-Ill AND WMS-lIl (Davis S. Tulsky
et al. eds., 2003). In addition, the practice effect would increase. See supra Part H.A.
64 See Ledford, 2008 WL 754486, at *8; Green, 515 F.3d at 300 n.2.
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tioner's scores otherwise falling below 70 above that threshold, federal
courts are reluctant to grant habeas relief based on an IQ score falling
within the borderline area."'65 Pointing to diversity in state approaches,
the district court concluded that "no decisive consensus exists among the
States, [so] the Texas courts did not unreasonably apply Atkins with re-
spect to its consideration of Briseno's IQ score."' 66 This conclusion re-
futes the clinical definitions and violates Atkins in precisely the same
way as a cutoff score does: it fails to take into account the SEM.67
The district court's statement in Briseno emphasizes an additional
point. Federal habeas review of state court determinations under the An-
titerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) com-
mands federal courts to uphold state court applications of law that are not
unreasonable, even if incorrect. 68 Under this standard of review, federal
courts are shy to overturn state court determinations rejecting downward
adjustment based on the SEM; the courts are reluctant to reverse what
appears to be a judgment call by the state court on the accuracy of an IQ
test score. The same problem exists with dismissing the SEM where
multiple proximate tests exist. One may readily argue that with life or
death on the line, it makes little sense not to err on the side of inclusion
of downward adjustment. 69 Federal courts should recognize that state
courts are exercising discretion where Atkins left none, unreasonably re-
fusing to apply the standard error of measurement that the clinical defini-
tions and Atkins require. This is particularly troublesome because of the
place of the intelligence criterion in determining mental retardation.
65 Briseno, 2007 WL 998743, at *10.
66 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
67 See Alfred L. Brophy, Confidence Intervals for True Scores and Retest Scores on
Clinical Tests, 42(6) J. OF CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 989 (1986); Robert G. Knight, On Interpreting
the Several Standard Errors of the WAIS-R: Some Further Tables, 51(5) J. OF CONSULTING
AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 671 (1983) (describing three methods of SEM for WAIS).
68 See, e.g., Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) ("The question under
AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect
but whether that determination was unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold.) (citing
AEDPA, 28 USC §§ 2254(d)(l)-(2) (2006)).
69 Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 27, at 836 ("If courts consider it desirable to err on
the side of finding mental retardation in Atkins cases in order to avoid the risk of mistakenly
executing a defendant who actually qualified for Eighth Amendment protection, perhaps they
would decide only to use SEM to decrease a score. If so, SEM could only be used to put a
defendant into the mentally retarded range but not to take a defendant out of that range.");
Weithorn, supra note 14, at 1206 ("[I]n light of the severity and finality of the death penalty,
state policies should err on the side of casting a net that is too wide rather than one that is too
narrow in defining 'mental retardation.' ").
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C. The Place of the Intelligence Criterion in Determining Mental
Retardation
For those functioning in the "upper boundary of mental retardation,"
as most capital defendants with mental retardation do, "IQ scores alone
cannot precisely identify an individual's functioning . .. and thus an
upper range of 70 to 75 is typically suggested. ' 70 It is erroneous to rule
out mental retardation simply because a person has an IQ just above 70
without first considering context and deficits in adaptive functioning. 71
For an individual with an IQ on the border of 70, Atkins's first prong
serves as a gateway to a consideration of adaptive behavior. The diagno-
sis is ultimately determined by whether the individual has significant
adaptive behavior deficits. 72 Cases like Cherry deny defendants whose
scores fall within a qualifying range an opportunity to establish adaptive
functioning limitations. Cherry was entitled to a fair assessment of adap-
tive functioning before being excluded from Atkins's pool.
III. THE CASE OF JEFFREY WILLIAMS, AND OTHER EXCLUSIONARY
INTERPRETATIONS OF ADAPTIVE FUNCTIONING
In contrast to Roger Cherry, Jeffrey Williams scored 70 or below on
his IQ test. The denial of Williams's Atkins claim turned on the courts'
interpretation of evidence of Williams's adaptive functioning. In Atkins,
the Supreme Court recognized that deficits in adaptive behavior reduce
the personal culpability of a defendant charged with a crime because they
contribute to a "diminished capacit[y] to understand and process infor-
mation, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from expe-
rience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to
70 AAIDD 10th ed., supra note 5, at 24. "IQ scores alone cannot precisely identify an
individual's functioning in the upper boundary of mental retardation . I..." Id. (suggesting an
upper range of 75).
71 See Caroline Everington & J. Gregory Olley, Implications of Atkins v. Virginia: Is-
sues in Defining and Diagnosing Mental Retardation, 8(1) J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRACTICE 1,
6 (2008) ("There is no finite score that can represent one's intellectual functioning with 100%
accuracy. There is always a measurement error .... Furthermore, this score does not stand in
isolation but must be considered with other evidence [(adaptive behavior)]."); Kay B. Stevens
& J. Randall Price, Adaptive Behavior, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, 6(3) J.
FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRACTICE 1, 21 (2006) ("Limiting the determination of mental retardation
to a specific IQ score is unacceptable due to multiple factors such as measurement error and
cultural bias.").
72 The original purpose of the concept of adaptive behavior in the clinical definitions was
to check false positives-it first appeared in the AAMR definition of mental retardation in
1959, with the intent "to better reflect the social characteristics of the disability, to reduce the
reliance on IQ scores, and to decrease the number of 'false positives,' or individuals falsely
identified as having mental retardation." AAMR 10th ed., supra note 5, at 24; see id. at 34
(adaptive behavior is "a bulwark against false positives that would occur if IQ was used as the
sole determinant of mental retardation").
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understand the reactions of others. '73 Williams presented evidence
showing that he was unable to live on his own, cook, hold a job, maintain
a stable home, dress appropriately for weather, or follow the rules of
games. Adhering to the skill areas identified by the clinical definitions,
the defense's expert-who concluded that Williams had mental retarda-
tion-and the State's expert-who concluded he did not-both identi-
fied adaptive functioning limitations in social skills. The defense's
expert found the evidence also showed significant limitations in practical
skills. According to the clinical definitions, these findings supported a
diagnosis of mental retardation.
The federal courts in Williams, however, found that other evi-
dence-including achievement tests, the opinions of multiple lay wit-
nesses that Williams did not have mental retardation, and evidence of
Williams's adaptive strengths-overrode the evidence of adaptive limita-
tions.74 The federal district court pointed to "substantial adaptive
strengths, finding that Williams rented an apartment, bought at least two
vehicles, [and] washed his clothes."'75 The Fifth Circuit further charac-
terized Williams's adaptive deficiencies as "bizarre and antisocial con-
duct," evincing characteristics that "are just as easily seen as attention-
getting behaviors as they are evidence of mental retardation" and could
be explained by "anti-social personality rather than mental retardation. 76
Focusing on adaptive strengths, and dismissing the deficits that Williams
experienced as symptoms of antisocial personality disorder, the federal
courts held that Williams failed to establish Atkins's second prong.
The courts were wrong on both counts. Persons with mental retar-
dation often have mental disorders as well. And because individuals
with mental retardation, even those with intelligence scores at the same
level, vary widely in what they can do, science does not prescribe a list
of abilities that exclude mental retardation, but rather defines mental re-
tardation by what an individual cannot do. No reasonable clinician
would have determined that Williams did not have mental retardation
merely because he also met a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder.
And no reasonable clinician would have excluded Williams simply be-
cause he was able to buy a car, purchase an apartment and wash his
clothes-particularly when other evidence showed that after Williams
bought the car, he failed to maintain it; that after he purchased his apart-
ment, he lost it and became homeless; and that, even if able to wash his
clothes, Williams did not manage his own hygiene. Williams's case is
73 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).
74 See Williams v. Quarterman, 293 Fed.Appx. 298, at 310-14 (5th Cir. 2008).
75 Id. at 312 (citing district court findings).
76 Id.
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representative of scientifically unsound and Atkins-violative assessments
of adaptive functioning.
A. Prioritizing Limitations, Not Strengths
The use of skill areas to define adaptive functioning is "contingent"
on a handful of principles, which help to form the "operational defini-
tion" of mental retardation. 77 Most important in criminal proceedings
are the principles that limitations often coexist with strengths and that
limitations in functioning must be assessed in the context of community
environments. The AAIDD explains:
Within an individual, limitations often coexist with
strengths. This means that people with mental retarda-
tion are complex human beings who likely have certain
gifts as well as limitations. Like all people, they often
do some things better than other things. Individuals may
have capabilities and strengths that are independent of
their mental retardation. These may include strengths in
social or physical capabilities, strengths in some adap-
tive skill areas, or strengths in one aspect of an adaptive
skill in which they otherwise show an overall
limitation .... 78
[M]ental retardation is not something you have, like blue
eyes or a bad heart. Nor is it something you are, like
being short or thin. It is not a medical disorder, although
it may be coded in a medical classification of diseases;
nor is it a mental disorder, although it may be coded in a
classification of psychiatric disorders. Mental retarda-
tion refers to a particular state of functioning that begins
in childhood, is multidimensional, and is affected posi-
tively by individualized supports ....
[A] comprehensive and correct understanding of the con-
dition of mental retardation requires a multidimensional
and ecological approach that reflects the interaction of
the individual and his or her environment, and the per-
son-referenced outcomes of that interaction related to in-
dependence, relationships, contributions, school and
community participation, and personal well-being. 79
77 AAMR 10th ed., supra note 5, at 8-9, 13, 27.
78 Id. at 8.
79 Id. at 48. See also George S. Baroff, Establishing Mental Retardation in Capital
Cases: An Update, 41(3) MENTAL RETARDATION 198, 199 (2003) ("Another way of illustrat-
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Knowing and applying these principles is critical to avoid the stere-
otyping that has historically led to misunderstandings of the adaptive
abilities of individuals with mental retardation. Because limitations de-
fine mental retardation, adaptive strengths are relevant only insofar as
they offset particular adaptive weaknesses. Understanding that limita-
tions coexist with strengths requires a particularized balancing of skill
area-specific strengths versus weaknesses within skill areas, rather than a
general assessment of overall adaptive behavior, which occurred in
Williams.80
1. Legacy of Stereotype
While adaptive strengths within skill areas are relevant insofar as
they offset evidence of a corresponding deficit, strengths in adaptive be-
havior can never negate a finding of mental retardation. "The diagnostic
criteria for [m]ental [r]etardation do not include an exclusion crite-
rion .... ",81 Strengths and weaknesses thus may coexist, but strengths
have no value independent of weaknesses. 82 Nevertheless, since Atkins,
numerous courts have dismissed mental retardation claims, finding no
adaptive behavior limitations, without mentioning the alleged deficits or
balancing them against the alleged strengths-relying, rather, entirely
upon alleged adaptive abilities.8 3
The consequence is that some courts, failing to engage in the careful
and thorough analysis called for by the various definitions of mental re-
tardation, resort to stereotype. Stereotyping has long been a problem
with regard to mental retardation. From early legal codes defining the
criminal defense of "idiocy" for "a person who cannot account or num-
ber twenty pence," to the early twentieth-century view that "every imbe-
ing the artificiality of IQ 70, or any other single IQ, is to compare the distribution of IQs to the
color spectrum. The latter ranges its colors in a series of very small steps, such that the transi-
tion from one color to another (e.g., yellow to orange) is so gradual that it is only at the
extreme of one color that its difference from the other is obvious. The point is that we are
asked to draw a diagnostic distinction that treats mental retardation as distinctly different from
borderline intelligence. In fact, like the color spectrum, they really overlap. The point of this
discussion is that rendering a decision as to mental retardation by IQ alone would be even
more arbitrary if the scores are either at the ceiling of one range or at the floor of the next. Of
course, the diagnosis is also based on adaptive behavior, and it can be expected that this
criterion will assume added significance when scores are at the boundary of the IQ ranges.").
80 See Lambert v. State, 126 P.3d 646 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005), discussed infra; Hol-
laday v. Campbell, 463 F.Supp.2d 1324 (N.D. Ala. 2006), discussed infra.
81 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 47.
82 See Lambert, 126 F.3d at 651 (recognizing that unless evidence of an adaptive
strength corresponds to an adaptive deficit upon which the defendant relies, evidence of the
strength is irrelevant to the proceedings, and should not even be admitted).
83 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 919 So.2d 1252 (Fla. 2005) (relying solely on the defen-
dant's outbursts during trial to refute mental retardation, even though the defendant's impul-
siveness and inappropriate behavior suggested adaptive behavior limitations consistent with
mental retardation).
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cile ... is a potential criminal," the "mentally retarded" have been
regarded as a group both incompetent and dangerous. 84 One would hope
that a positive byproduct of the clinical shift from generalized assessment
of adaptive behavior to a focus on the inability to perform particular core
skills would have been acknowledgement that "[m]entally retarded peo-
ple are individuals" and that "[a]ny attempt to describe them as a group
risks false stereotyping and therefore demands the greatest caution. '8 5
But despite scientific advances and evolving social perspective, stereo-
type still pervades adaptive behavior assessment in capital cases.
Several years ago, the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected expert
reports and standardized test results showing adaptive behavior limita-
tions, and denied an evidentiary hearing on mental retardation because
the evidence was at odds with the court's and the State's understanding
of what "retarded people cannot do":
These reports, affidavits and testimonies do not paint the
picture of a retarded person. Simply because retarded
people do not operate heavy machinery, retarded people
do not drive tractors, retarded people do not hold jobs
for much longer than a year at a time, much less work
two jobs at a time, retarded people are not admitted to
the radio operator school of the Army, retarded people
do not get drivers licenses, buy cars and drive cars. Fur-
ther, retarded people do not support families and see to it
that all the bills are paid, retarded people do not see to
the care of others and make sure they have enough
money, a nice house, and school clothes.86
The Mississippi court likely would not have used the phrase "re-
tarded people do not" if the court possessed a more realistic understand-
ing of what suffering from mental retardation actually means.87 Even
84 See James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Defendants, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 414, 416-20 (1988); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 454-55 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The discrimination against the men-
tally retarded that is at issue in this case is the city's decision to require an annual special use
permit before property in an apartment house district may be used as a group home for persons
who are mildly retarded. The record convinces me that this permit was required because of the
irrational fears of neighboring property owners, rather than for the protection of the mentally
retarded persons who would reside in respondent's home."); cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200
(1927) (discussing sterilization of the "feeble-minded").
85 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 84, at 427.
86 Wiley v. State, 890 So.2d 892, 897 (Miss. 2004) (emphasis added), affd, Wiley v.
Epps, No. 2:OOCVI30-P-A, 2007 WL 405041 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 2, 2007).
87 Accord Brown v. State, 959 So.2d 146, 150 (Fla. 2007) (acknowledging that 68 FSIQ
qualified, but finding mental retardation diagnosis "was contradictory to the evidence that
Brown was engaged in a five-year intimate relationship prior to the crime, that he had his
driver's license and drove a car, and that he was employed in numerous jobs including as a
OF ATKINS AND MEN
prior to the court's decision in Wiley, it was estimated that eighty-nine
percent of all persons with mental retardation "can usually acquire the
vocational and social skills necessary for independent living. ' 88 Individ-
uals with mental retardation can drive, hold jobs, make money, and oper-
ate heavy machinery. 89 Nevertheless, in cases such as Wiley, classic
stereotyping of individuals with mental retardation prevails over evi-
dence and expert testimony showing significant limitations in adaptive
skills.90
mechanic"); Hughes v. State, 892 So.2d 203, 215 (Miss. 2004) (discussing Wiley, 890 So.2d at
896) ("This Court found [the expert's] affidavit in [Wiley] insufficient to warrant an eviden-
tiary hearing [in part] because ... the record indicated that Wiley possessed significant adap-
tive skills, i.e., sustained employment, military service, and school attendance without special
education classes.").
88 Alexander Kassoff, Note, Evolving Standards of Decency in Mississippi: Chase v.
State, Capital Punishment, and Mental Retardation, 25 Miss. C. L. REV. 221, 254 (2006)
(quoting MARTHA A. FIELD & VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL RETARDATION 32 (1999)). The commentator points to an individual with mental re-
tardation who was awarded a Mayoral Service Award in DC, noting that "[t]he Thorntons'
lives dramatically illustrate the potential dangers when judges - or anyone else other than
trained mental health professionals - make decisions about who does and who does not have
mental retardation." id. at 253.
89 See Lambert v. State, 126 P.3d 646, 657 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005).
90 Just as stereotype ought not trump expert opinion, courts must look for stereotype in
lay opinion. Reliance on stereotype, again in denying an evidentiary hearing on mental retar-
dation, was criticized by a dissenting Texas Court of Criminal Appeals justice:
Lay persons often have unrealistic ideas about what mentally retarded persons look
like and how they act. There is a wide range of abilities encompassed by the term
'mentally retarded'; the term applies equally to those whose are able to live success-
ful independent lives and to those who live and die in a vegetative state. Mr. Tatum
attested that he 'knew some kids in school with Down's syndrome' and that appel-
lant is not retarded. It is well known that Down's syndrome creates a distinctive
physical appearance. If Down's syndrome is Mr. Tatum's standard for diagnosing
mental retardation, then of course, appellant is not retarded in his eyes.
Ms. Prosperie claimed to know that appellant is not retarded because her neighbor's
daughter is retarded. We do not know the extent of that child's retardation or how it
manifests in appearance and behavior.
Mr. White said that appellant is not retarded because his uncle is retarded, and appel-
lant is not like his uncle.
Mr. Boles, looking back to the time of the offense, says that appellant is not retarded,
and the state asserts that Boles is qualified to make that judgment because he now
works with mentally challenged children.
Each of these lay witnesses appear to have judged appellant's mental capacity by
personal standards formed by personal experience with a very small number of re-
tarded persons. Given the wide range of manifestations of mental retardation, these
witnesses, although sincere, do not have the experience or training to make any as-
sessment of the mental abilities of appellant .... I am loathe to find that appellant is
not mentally retarded when that finding is based largely on the lay opinions of a
store supervisor, a waitress, a bag boy, and five prison guards, and the expert opinion
of a psychologist who could not reach a definite conclusion, especially when all had
limited contact with appellant.
Hall v. State 160 S.W.3d 24, 43-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Johnson, J., dissenting). Denying
an evidentiary hearing on Atkins, the court relied solely on evidence from a sentencing pro-
ceeding that took place before Atkins. The United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
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More often, the nod to stereotype is less obvious than it was in Wi-
ley. The Fifth Circuit opinion in Clark v. Quarterman provides an unfor-
tunate example. Responding to a challenge that the lower courts erred in
relying "exclusively upon the court's own interpretation of testimony
about Clark's adaptive strengths" and solely on "evidence of strengths
and not limitations," 9' the court dismissed the petitioner's argument as
"incorrect," concluding that "evidence of a strength in a particular area of
adaptive functioning necessarily shows that the defendant does not have
a weakness in that particular area."' 92 "Even if adaptive limitations rather
than strengths often define mental retardation," the court added, "the evi-
dence in this case shows primarily adaptive strengths and does not show
limitation in any significant area."'93 Evidence of an adaptive strength or
strengths may disprove a deficit, but does not necessarily do so. Further,
limitations rather than strengths do not "often" define mental retarda-
tion-they always do.94 As in Wiley and Clark, the result in Williams
was fueled by the erroneous belief that because an individual can do
certain things, he or she cannot have mental retardation. The true mea-
sure of adaptive functioning is what an individual cannot do.
2. The Glass Half-Full Perspective: Briseno
According dispositive weight to strengths not only strays from the
clinical definitions, it also alters the landscape of a mental retardation
hearing. If a strength, regardless of its affiliation to a limitation, can
refute a claim of mental retardation, the proceeding takes on a different
and less stable character than if the only relevant issue is proof of limita-
tions. When alleged limitations are the focus, the limitations provide a
foundation upon which to measure the evidence. 95 Without that founda-
tion, courts understandably may feel adrift amidst disconnected facts
(some supporting adaptive behavior and some countering, not necessarily
within the same skill areas) from which they are asked to divine a con-
clusion. This unmoored perspective amplifies the extent to which courts
may view the adaptive behavior determination as a subjective battle of
trict of Texas upheld the state court's rejection of Hall's mental retardation claim, Hall v.
Quarterman, 443 F.Supp.2d 815 (N.D. Tex. 2006), but the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded,
holding that Hall was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Hall v. Quarterman 534 F.3d 365
(5th Cir. 2008).
91 See Clark v. Quarterman, 457 F.3d 441,446-47 (5th Cir. 2006), affg Exparte Clark,
No. 37288-02, 2004 WL 885583 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2004).
92 Id. at 447.
93 Id.
94 Similar challenges to adjudications of mental retardation claims have repeatedly lost
in Texas federal and state courts. See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 421 F.3d 308, 313 n.15
(5th Cir. 2005); Briseno v. Dretke, No. L-05-08, 2007 WL 998743, at *15 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29,
2007). But see Lambert v. State, 126 P.3d 646 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005).
95 See Lambert, 126 P.3d 646.
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experts. It thrives on the (mis)perception that Atkins gives courts pre-
cious little, if any, guidance on how to distinguish and make determina-
tions between expert diagnoses.
In Texas, this perspective is the norm. And it has spurred judicial
addendum to the Atkins-approved clinical definitions. Texas state and
federal courts, including the courts in Williams, complain that determin-
ing adaptive behavior is a "highly subjective" choice between "dueling
diagnosticians" in dire need of additional structure. 96 They see mental
retardation as attuned to the eye of the beholder, depending ultimately
upon whether one views the metaphorical glass as half-empty or half-
full. 97 From this perspective, "uniform application" of clinical defini-
tions of mental retardation is "impractical[], if not impossib[le]. ' 98
This perceived "quagmire" 99 pushed the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals to articulate "evidentiary factors which factfinders in the crimi-
nal trial context might also focus upon in weighing evidence as indica-
tive of mental retardation or a personality disorder." 1° The Briseno
96 This statement provides an example:
The current unavailability of a Supreme Court-sanctioned, uniform, legal definition
of "mental retardation," along with the highly subjective nature of current clinical
definitions of that term, has created a situation in which the determination of whether
a particular criminal defendant or convicted capital murderer is "mentally retarded"
often becomes a battle between dueling diagnosticians .... The dueling diagnosti-
cians who have disagreed in petitioner's case have been talking past each other, i.e.,
discussing whether they believed petitioner was mentally retarded without first
agreeing upon a single definition of that term ....
Rodriguez v. Quarterman, No. Civ. SA-05-CA-659-RF, 2006 WL 1900630, at *12 & n.70
(W.D. Tex. July 11, 2006).
97 See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
98 Rodriguez, 2006 WL 1900630, at *12.
99 Rivera v. Dretke, No. Civ. B-03-139, 2006 WL 870927, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31,
2006) ("As anyone who reads Atkins readily realizes, each side of a capital case will have to
retain an expert, both of whom should be prepared to cover the intellectual functioning and
adaptive abilities of the petitioner. This places the finder of fact in the position of having to
sift through the quagmire of conflicting testimony inherent in cases that involve 'dueling
experts."').
100 Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8. There are seven Briseno factors:
" Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage -his family,
friends, teachers, employers, authorities - think he was mentally retarded at that
time, and, if so, act in accordance with that determination?
" Has the person formulated plans and carried them through or is his conduct
impulsive?
" Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that he is led around by others?
" Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless
of whether it is socially acceptable?
" Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions
or do his responses wander from subject to subject?
" Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others' interests?
" Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense,
did the commission of that offense require forethought, planning, and complex
execution of purpose?
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factors present an array of divergences from the clinical definitions.
First, as the court's statement indicates, Briseno erroneously pits mental
retardation against personality disorders in an either-or dichotomy. Fur-
thermore, the factors adhere by turns to stereotype or label-such as fac-
tor 1, which asks whether people who knew the defendant thought he
was "mentally retarded"-and focus solely on adaptive strengths-such
as factor 7, which asks whether the crime required forethought and plan-
ning, and factor 6, which asks whether the defendant is able to lie and
hide facts. Even the factors that do point to traits that "occur with suffi-
cient frequency to warrant certain limited generalizations"10 '-for in-
stance, people with mental retardation often have limited communication
skills and may not be able to provide coherent responses, 10 2 have poor
impulse control, 10 3 and are more often followers than leaders-fail to
address significant qualifications to these generalizations. Individuals
with mental retardation often cannot focus on the specifics of what an
interviewer is asking and therefore "may appear to steer away deviously
from certain lines of testimony,"'1 4 and thus may appear to hide facts or
lie. Many individuals with mental retardation will say what they think
the interviewer wants to hear, regardless of its accuracy, 05 and will over-
rate their skills and mask their limitations. 0 6 Therefore, what resembles
coherence may actually be feigned.
Overall, the Briseno factors narrow the scope of relevant behaviors
to a limited group of questions from a universe of possibilities, 0 7 and as
such fail to fully address all skill areas set out in the clinical defini-
tions-areas such as home living and self-care are ignored. Thus, a
factfinder applying all the factors will not necessarily have assessed the
full possibility of adaptive deficits, and therefore cannot rule out the pos-
sibility of significant limitations in adaptive functioning.
Texas courts see Briseno as resolving the question of who decides
the legal issue of mental retardation, the factfinder or the clinician. 0 8
Id. at 8-9.
101 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 84, at 427, 428-32.
102 Id. at 428.
103 Id. at 429.
104 Id.
105 See id. at 429-30, 431-32.
106 See id. at 430.
107 See Holladay v. Campbell, 463 F.Supp. 2d 1324, 1343 (N.D. Ala. 2006) ("It is impor-
tant, in determining whether a person is or is not mentally retarded, not to pick and choose so
as to over-emphasize certain characteristics" and citing in full the AAMR principle emphasiz-
ing that "limitations often coexist with strengths.").
108 See Briseno v. Dretke, No. L-05-08, 2007 WL 998743, at *15 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29,
2007):
Nothing in federal law authorizes habeas relief based on an alleged misapplication of
professional psychological standards alone. Admittedly, clinical methodology in
forms [sic] the mental retardation review, but the Court of Criminal Appeals cor-
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But the image of dueling diagnosticians at the decision's core is out of
proportion. In reaching its conclusion, the court overlooked a difference
between clinical judgment and mere "subjectivity." While an expert's
opinion-like any opinion-is by definition somewhat subjective, it is
worthy of respect because it is grounded in the clinician's training, expe-
rience with clients, knowledge of data, and adherence to accepted meth-
ods and principles. 109 The AAIDD warns that clinical judgment "should
not be thought of as a justification for abbreviated evaluations, a vehicle
for stereotypes or prejudices, a substitute for insufficiently explored
questions, [or] an excuse for incomplete or missing data."'110 The State's
expert in Briseno used "clinical judgment" incorrectly in all of these
ways. It is not necessary to resolve differences between experts where
one expert applies methodology that does not generally conform to the
clinical definitions. 1 '
One might view the Briseno factors as a not-too-distant relative of
the Fifth Circuit nexus requirements for mitigating evidence that the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly rejected. For example, in Smith and Ten-
nard, the Fifth Circuit demanded that mitigation make a difference in
certain ways that the court deemed important.1 12 In overruling these de-
cisions, the Supreme Court held that all mitigation offered by a defendant
is relevant; a defendant need not establish any nexus to the crime or fit
into any other box manufactured by a court to have mitigating evidence
considered by a jury. 113 Like the Tennard nexus requirement, the
Briseno factors create their own world of relevance, redefining the ques-
rectly understood that the Constitution, not differing opinions by qualified experts,
defines the class of those mentally retarded offenders excluded from execution:
Although experts may offer insightful opinions on the question of whether a
particular person meets the psychological diagnostic criteria for mental retarda-
tion, the ultimate issue of whether this person is, in fact, mentally retarded for
purposes of the Eighth Amendment ban on excessive punishment is one for the
finder of fact, based upon all of the evidence and determinations of credibility.
(quoting Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).
See also Rodriguez v. Quarterman, No. Civ. SA-05-CA-659-RF, 2006 WL 1900630, at
* 11 (W.D. Tex. July 11, 2006) ("Like most clinical definitions drawn from the medical and
biological sciences, the foregoing definitions cited, but not specifically adopted, by the Su-
preme Court do not transfer easily into the realm of law, where legally valid distinctions and
classifications must necessarily be based on more than a subjective choice between the con-
flicting testimony of differing diagnosticians.").
109 SCHALOCK & LucKAsSON, supra note 30, at 1.
110 Id. at 91.
111 There are cases applying Briseno in which defendants have been found to have mental
retardation. See Ex Parte Modden, 147 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (finding unani-
mous expert agreement supports mental retardation; dissent arguing facts do not meet Briseno
factors); see also In re Heam, 376 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2004) (majority finding mental retarda-
tion; dissent disputing IQ and adaptive functioning), aftd, 418 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2005).
112 See Smith v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 661, 680-81 (5th Cir. 2002); Tennard v. Cockrell, 284
F.3d 591, 597 (5th Cir. 2002).
113 See Termard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004).
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tions that make up the constitutional determination.1 14 Undoubtedly, this
gives courts more direction. But the Briseno factors focus on a few facts,
which portray stereotype, strength-first or strength-only reasoning, at
best a handful of itemized weaknesses, and are satisfied by the answers
to those questions alone. Once the adaptive behavior determination is
properly viewed as reliant upon proof of limitations, the scope of the
proceedings narrows and focuses appropriately on the particular limita-
tions the defendant alleges.1 15
B. Focus on Skill Areas
If a court follows the clinical definitions and the operational princi-
ples, an assessment of adaptive functioning "generally conforming" to
Atkins must consider the deficits claimed by the defendant in the context
of the skill areas the definitions set forth and balance the evidence sup-
porting the alleged adaptive limitations against evidence of adaptive
strengths that offset those deficits. 1 16 Skill areas and the assumption of
coexisting strengths and weaknesses within and between skill areas ne-
cessitate particularized balancing. Particularized balancing, in turn,
helps to clarify the relevance of evidence.1 17
A good example of particularized balancing is found in Holladay v.
Campbell."18 In Holladay, the petitioner alleged limitations in all skill
areas. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ala-
bama, emphasizing that limitations coexist with strengths,'" 9 grouped the
evidence relevant to adaptive behavior into two categories: that
"tend[ing] to show limitation(s) in adaptive functional behavior" and that
114 It follows that defense counsel who consent to the constitutionality of the Briseno
factors should be challenged as ineffective. Defendants must not acquiesce to use of the
Briseno factors. However, this has happened. See Moreno v. Dretke, 450 F.3d 158, 164 (5th
Cir. 2006) ("Moreno does not dispute that these are correct definitions of mental retardation.").
115 See Lambert v. State, 126 P.3d 646 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005).
116 See, e.g., Walker v. True, 399 F.3d 315, 321 (4th Cir. 2005), on remand, Walker v.
True, No. 03-0764 (E.D. Va. Aug. 30, 2006) (no mental retardation found because no adaptive
deficits).
117 At this point, nearly every jurisdiction has formally or implicitly adopted the skill area
model. See, e.g., State v. Frazier, 873 N.E.2d 1263, 1291-92 (Ohio 2007) ("Moreover, neither
Dr. Forgac nor Dr. Smalldon found that Frazier has 'significant limitations in adaptive func-
tioning in at least two skill areas,' as Atkins requires."); Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 567-68
(Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Blonner v. State, 127 P.3d 1135
(Okla. Crim. App. 2006). Yet some courts and some states still rely on a generalized determi-
nation of adaptive behavior. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-703.02(K)(1), (K)(2)
(2008); State v. Grell, 135 P.3d 969, 709 (Ariz. 2006) ("The DSM-IV definition of mental
retardation, however, while similar in overall meaning, is not the same as the statutory defini-
tion .... The statute requires an overall assessment of the defendant's ability to meet soci-
ety's expectations of him. It does not require a finding of mental retardation based solely on
proof of specific deficits or deficits in only two areas.").
118 463 F.Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ala. 2006).
119 See id. at 1343.
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"tend[ing] to show the absence of limitations in adaptive functional be-
havior."' 20 Within those two categories, the court further allocated the
evidence according to skill area, itemizing each evidentiary fact as rele-
vant to one or more of the following areas: home living, self-care, health
and safety, social skills, self-direction, communication, work, functional
academics, and community use. 12 1 The court then factored in the results
of a standardized test administered to two of the defendant's relatives
and expert testimony. 122
Both parties in Holladay agreed that the defendant had significant
limitations in functional academic skills. The "remaining question" for
the court, therefore, was simply whether Holladay had significant limita-
tions in any other skill area.' 23 Balancing the facts tending to show a
limitation against those tending to show the absence of a limitation in
each skill area, the court found significant limitations in five areas of the
AAMR 9th edition-communication, social skills, community use, func-
tional academics, and work. 124 Applying the AAMR 10th edition skill
areas, the court found significant limitations in all three areas-concep-
tual, practical, and social.' 25 Affirming the district court's decision, the
Eleventh Circuit emphasized that "[i]ndividuals with mental retardation
have strengths and weaknesses, like all individuals [and] [i]ndeed, the
criteria for diagnosis recognizes this by requiring a showing of deficits in
only two of ten identified areas of adaptive functioning."' 126 The State's
expert's "predominant focus on Holladay's actions surrounding the
crime," the circuit court noted, "suggests that she did not recognize
this." 27
An equally. thorough and even more efficient approach was taken by
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Lambert v. State, where the
defendant alleged significant limitations in only certain skill areas. 128
120 Id. at 1334.
121 See id. at 1336-39.
122 See id. at 1340.
123 See id. at 1343.
124 See id. at 1346. For example, with respect to the "work" category, the court noted the
following supported adaptive limitations: that Holladay did not function well in a painting job,
would grow frustrated and leave the site, was not capable of buying paint, and didn't know a
screwdriver from a scraper; he could not work machines at a tire store; none of his jobs re-
quired significant intellectual ability; Holladay never found work on his own initiative. Id. at
1337-38. The court found that the following tended show an absence of limitations with
respect to work skills: he did not have trouble following directions at his tire store job; he also
worked at a chicken plant. Id. at 1338.
125 Id. at 1346 n.29.
126 Holladay v. Allen, 555 F.3d 1346, 1363 (11th Cir. 2009).
127 Id.
128 See Lambert v. State, 126 P.3d 646, 652 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (finding significant
deficits in four of the nine adaptive-functioning skill areas). In Lambert, the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals applied a definition of mental retardation the court adopted in the wake of
Atkins. Id. at 650; see also Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 567-68 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002),
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The court fine-tuned its adaptive functioning analysis to focus only on
skill areas in which Lambert alleged deficits:
Unless a defendant's evidence of particular limitations is
specifically contradicted by evidence that he does not
have those limitations, then the defendant's burden is
met no matter what evidence the State might offer that
he has no deficits in other skill areas. In fact, the State
need not present any evidence that a capital defendant
can function in areas other than those in which a deficit
is claimed. In capital mental retardation proceedings,
the State's first response must always be to counter the
evidence presented by the defendant. 129
The defendant presented proof of deficits in four of the nine skill
areas: health and safety, academics, communication, and social and inter-
personal skills. 130 The State accepted the existence of these skill-area
deficits, but offered alternative explanations. The State argued that the
defendant did not have mental retardation because his limitations were
caused by antisocial personality disorder, schizophrenia, conduct disor-
der, and drug abuse. 131 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals cor-
rectly dismissed this argument, finding that "[b]y accepting Lambert's
assertions that he had limitations in these skill areas, the State failed to
contradict his claims."1 32 By grounding the assessment in alleged limita-
tions, Lambert and Holladay applied Atkins without the need for addi-
tional factors such as those listed in Briseno.
overruled on other grounds by Blonner v. State, 127 P.3d 1135 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006).
Blonner overruled procedures set forth in Murphy but retained the definition of mental retarda-
tion as a three-prong test:
(1) If he or she functions at a significantly sub-average intellectual level that sub-
stantially limits his or her ability to understand and process information, to commu-
nicate, to learn from experience or mistakes, to engage in logical reasoning, to
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others;
(2) The mental retardation manifested itself before the age of eighteen (18); and
(3) The mental retardation is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive
functioning in at least two of [nine] skill areas ....
(footnotes omitted). The definition mirrored the AAMR 9th ed. definition, requiring as one
prong that the defendant show significant limitations in adaptive functioning, and for that
requiring a showing of significant limitations in two of nine skill areas. See id.
129 Lambert, 126 P.3d at 651.
130 Id. at 652.
131 See id. at 652-53, 655, 659 (presenting and rejecting these arguments as separate from
the evidence of mental retardation, as drug abuse does not affect mental retardation, which is
present from birth, and mental illnesses, which are also separate from mental retardation).
132 Id. at 653.
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The approach taken in cases like Lambert and Holladay follows the
clinical definitions. 33 It also helps to guide courts through some of the
difficult questions in adaptive behavior assessment, including: what im-
pact should a petitioner's behavior in prison have on the adaptive behav-
ior determination, and how should the circumstances of the crime affect
the determination?
C. Prison Behavior is Not a Reliable Measure of Adaptive
Functioning
A familiar argument confronting capital defendants who assert
mental retardation is that their behavior in prison shows otherwise. Par-
ticipation in prison programs, having magazine subscriptions, studying
for or acquiring a GED while in prison, and filling out a grievance form
are all examples of activities that have been offered to disprove mental
retardation. 134 Consider this position, adopted by the Fifth Circuit in
Clark v. Quarterman:
Our review of the evidence of Clark's behavior in prison
casts serious doubts on his claims of adaptive limitation,
as evidence collected from his cell along with his hand-
written requests include[:]
[C]omplaints that he needed a technician to fix his tele-
vision as it had been several 'weeks now of no reception
via my coaxial cable hooked up to the jack on the wall;'
[A] handwritten diet plan entitled "Eat to Beat
Stress" noting that he should 'eat small meals and
snacks several times a day to keep blood sugar from
fluctuating' as well as notes about the effects of va-
rious chemicals such as folic acid, pyridoxine, and
thiamine;
[H]andwritten puzzles including the decipherment
of several extremely complicated codes; and
[C]omplaints about delays in approving his request
for a legal visit with another inmate in which Clark
planned to assist the inmate in obtaining parole.1 35
The Fifth Circuit focused on strengths in the same way that the testi-
mony of a former employer may make the point that the defendant was a
133 Accord State v. White, 885 N.E.2d 905, 915 (Ohio 2008) (reversing trial court's find-
ing of no mental retardation because the trial court erred, when considering White's adaptive
functioning, in focusing on whether White exhibited behavior that was "bizarre" or "out of the
ordinary").
134 See, e.g., Clark v. Quarterman, 457 F.3d 441, 447 (5th Cir. 2006).
135 Id.
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good worker and could follow directions, or a court may look to a defen-
dant's prior testimony, note-taking during the trial, or coherent allocution
at sentencing to prove an absence of limitation.' 36 If courts follow the
clinical definitions' focus on limitations, none of this should matter-
unless the defendant has alleged adaptive limitations that behavior in
prison disproves, none of it is relevant.
A thorough investigation is critical to uncover the truth about an
individual's capabilities. Aside from taking into account the defendant's
active attempt to wear a "cloak of competence,"1 37 counsel and courts
are well advised to take a close look at whether the asserted strengths are
more than mere appearances. For example, is the defendant actually
reading the books or magazines in his cell? Did he actually fill out the
administrative forms?138 Greenspan and Switzsky have reported that
"[g]iven the amount of time that a condemned prisoner has to think about
his life, and to discuss his case with attorneys and others, it is not surpris-
ing that an Atkins applicant, even one who clearly has MR, might be able
to show some surface sophistication in discussing what he would and
136 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 919 So.2d 1252, 1266 (Fla. 2005). En route to finding
the defendant had no significant limitations in adaptive behavior, the court rejected the results
of a standardized test scoring the defendant two standardized deviations below the mean, and
relied instead on the defendant's behavior at trial:
Rodriguez's behavior throughout the trial proceedings indicated his awareness and
understanding about what was happening in the courtroom. He variously made com-
ments about the prosecutor's statements and the evidence presented, even denying
his presence at the murder scene during one witness's testimony. Rodriguez's sub-
sequent conversations with Dr. Haber, particularly one in which he recited the
State's plea offer in detail, also indicate an understanding of the situation. These
incidents support the trial court's finding that Dr. Haber's opinion was not only
adequate, but also completely supported by the evidence.
Id. But this impulsive and inappropriate behavior also supports a diagnosis of mental retarda-
tion. Indeed, it resembles some of the characteristics of individuals with mental retardation
that the Atkins opinion found jeopardized the possibility of fair trial and sentencing proceed-
ings where mentally retarded defendants are involved. Incredibly, the Florida court simultane-
ously held that "there was no evidence at all that the defendant had any memory impairments
or problems of impulsivity." Id. (citing the trial court's decision).
137 See James R. Patton & Denis W. Keyes, Death Penalty Issues Following Atkins, 14(4)
EXCEPTIONALrrY 237, 252 (2006).
138 See Ellis & Luckasson supra note 84, at 430-31; see also Hall v. State 160 S.W.3d 24,
44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Johnson, J., dissenting) ("I am unpersuaded that bragging or using
big words and claiming to read classic literature establishes that appellant is not retarded. If
appellant is, in fact, retarded, his statements may establish only that he, like many retarded
persons, wishes to be regarded as 'normal' and 'smart' and that he will behave in ways that he
thinks will cause others to regard him as such, just as persons with normal intelligence will
behave in ways that are perceived as producing acceptance. As Dr. Church noted in her affida-
vit, appellant 'had difficulty with the requirements of doing the work of a "stocker" and was
demoted to bagging groceries.' She also stated, 'His main motivation is not to appear to be a
"dummy" in order to mask his deficits. He tends to say what he has heard others say and/or to
say what he thinks others expect him to say. This is not at all unusual as a coping mechanism
for the mentally retarded population.').
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should have done differently to avoid his current predicament."'' 39 Sev-
eral examples from Lambert, in which assertions of prison behavior as
strengths were refuted, illustrate the importance of thorough inspection:
Prosecutors offered evidence from prison employees
who had frequent but brief contact with Lambert, had
received his requisition slips, and did not believe he was
retarded. However, those employees could not say that
Lambert himself filled out all his requisitions, as they
were not present when the slips were written. They
could not say Lambert read the books he checked out.
While they disagreed on many issues, these witnesses
could not contradict Lambert's cellmates' testimony...
[that they often filled out prison requisition slips for
Lambert, and that he checked out books for other in-
mates to read since he did not read books]. 140
The State's same institutional witnesses testified that
they had little or no trouble communicating with Lam-
bert, that he was not a discipline problem in prison, and
that he seemed to understand the routines and procedures
expected of him. None of these witnesses testified to
long or complex conversations which required an ex-
change of ideas or feelings. In addition, all the expert
witnesses agreed that mentally retarded persons adapt
very well to institutional settings such as prison, and are
unlikely to exhibit problems with impulse control in
those settings.
14 1
But there is more at stake with reliance on prison behavior than
issues of evidentiary relevance. The operational principle that
"[l]imitations in present functioning must be considered within the con-
text of community environments typical of the individual's age peers and
culture" means that the "individual's functioning must be measured
[against] typical community-based environments, not environments that
are segregated by ability."142 Death row is an atypical, segregated, struc-
tured, and regulated community, and presents circumstances of "legal
restraint," in which adaptive behavior assessments are "less than opti-
139 Stephen Greenspan & Harvey N. Switzky, Lessons from the Atkins Decision for the
Next AAMR Manual, in WHAT IS MENTAL RETARDATION? IDEAS FOR AN EVOLVING DISABIL-
rry iN THE 21ST CENTURY 283, 293 (Harvey N. Switzky & Stephen Greenspan eds., 2006).
140 Lambert v. State, 126 P.3d 646, 652 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (emphasis added).
141 Id.
142 AAMR 10th ed., supra note 5, at 8.
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mal."143 In this structured circumstance, "the role of the person's imme-
diate environment [must be] integrated into the assessment."'144
Members of the scientific community note that prison's limited op-
portunities "[make] it impossible to assess 'adaptive behavior within the
context of community environments...' as required by the 2002 AAMR
standards."1 45 In part, this is because "[p]rison officials ... do not have
the experience with the individual in community contexts to provide a
valid assessment of skills."1 46 Others have stressed that prison assess-
ments of adaptive behavior are suspect because "[m]any 'real-world'
adaptive behaviors (e.g., transportation skills) are not possible in this set-
ting and therefore cannot be measured"; "certain adaptive behaviors
(e.g., grooming) may appear better due to the structure"; and "some
adaptive behavior deficits (e.g., inability to read) can be masked by the
appearance of reading (i.e., looking at reading material such as a newspa-
per but instead of actually reading merely looking at the pictures or
sports scores)."147 Accordingly, it has been suggested that, because "few
measures of adaptive functioning have been designed or normed for use
143 See AAIDD 10th ed., supra note 5, at 14 (stating that assessment in a less than optimal
conditions "necessitate[s] considering assessment purposes and specific guidelines to enhance
the precision, accuracy, and integrity of the clinician's diagnosis").
144 Id. at 15 (stating that in "challenging diagnostic conditions," assessment must consider
the role of the immediate environment).
145 Everington & Olley, supra note 71, at 12.
146 See id. (noting this presents difficulties because "standardized assessments require in-
formants who have observed the individual perform a broad range of skills in community
contexts"); see also Bethany Young et al., Four Practical and Conceptual Assessment Issues
That Evaluators Should Address in Capital Case Mental Retardation Evaluations, 38(2) PROF.
PSYCH OL.: Rits. AND PRAC. 169, 174 (2007) ("Although prison employees can be valuable
sources of information about functioning in the prison environment, they will not have ob-
served the offender outside of the secure setting, may have little knowledge about the adaptive
behavior of persons with mild to moderate mental retardation, and may feel pressured by peers
to report a high level of functioning.") (citations omitted); John M. Fabian, supra note 47, at
13-14 (noting problems with correctional staff as source of information about adaptive func-
tioning because they "may be plagued by certain biases for or against the defendant," "there
may be a consensus among staff that experts are coming to death row to 'get the prisoner off
the hook,"' "officers may have their own lay opinions on what retardation is and may also not
believe these defendants are retarded because they are criminals and function fairly well in
some areas," and some officers are "more likely to have experienced conflicts with the defend-
ants which may cause bias against the defendant in an evaluative setting"); Stevens & Price,
supra note 71, at 16 ("Correctional officers are sometimes selected as informal informants, yet
they may be biased regarding the death penalty, inhibited by institutional policies or peer
pressure, and/or poorly informed.").
147 Patton & Keyes, supra note 137, at 249 (stating that prison assessments should be
avoided for these reasons); accord Young et al., supra note 146, at 171 (noting that using
typical methods of assessment of adaptive functioning in capital cases may be inappropriate
because, due to length of time spent in restrictive settings, the subject "may have had little
opportunity to display social, conceptual or practical skills on a routine basis in nonrestricted
settings," compared with people who provided normative data and because "behaviors that are
considered to be adaptive in the general population may not be adaptive in prison environ-
ments or within certain peer groups").
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with institutionalized correctional populations [the] immediate best pro-
fessional choice appears to base adaptive functioning evaluations of capi-
tal case and death row inmates on a clinical synthesis of both
preincarceration functioning and current functioning." 148
D. The Limited Probative Value of the "Sophistication" of the Crime
Some courts have found that a defendant failed to establish signifi-
cant adaptive functioning limitations based on evidence of the defen-
dant's conduct during the crime. Briseno suggested consideration of
numerous factors, including whether "the commission of the offense re-
quire[d] forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose."' 149
While the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has emphasized the circum-
stances of the crime as a factor in assessing adaptive behavior deficits, 150
other courts have expressed skepticism about the relevance of crime cir-
cumstances.'51 Legislatures, too, have debated this point.' 52
A recent article in the Texas Bar Journal emphasizes that when "as-
sessing a person's level of adaptive functioning, it is important to look at
every aspect of the defendant's life including what some experts describe
as 'criminal adaptive functioning,'" colloquially known as "'street
smarts' . . . [or the ability] to 'think on [one's] feet.' "153 "While most
defense experts will attempt to emphasize subaverage results of either IQ
or other psychological testing," the author states, "most jurors are quite
capable of assessing the credibility of such evidence when confronted
with credible evidence of a planned, premeditated crime, and evidence of
a defendant who has functioned independently in society."' 54 Minimiz-
148 Stanley L. Brodsky & Virginia A. Galloway, Ethical and Professional Demands for
Forensic Mental Health Professionals in the Post-Atkins Era, 13(1) ETHICS & BEHAV. 3, 7
(2003); see also Stevens & Price, supra note 71, at 19 ("[F]orensic evaluators should consider
adaptation to prison incarceration as one factor of many in their assessment of adaptive
behavior.").
149 Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
150 See, e.g., Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (finding no
adaptive behavior deficits where the defendant's criminal acts showed "that he was capable of
planning elaborate criminal ventures and attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to conceal the
evidence").
151 See e.g., Holladay v. Campbell, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1347 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (re-
jecting the suggestion that "Petitioner's extremely violent conduct and later temporary avoid-
ance of capture forecloses a determination of mental retardation").
152 See Peggy Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded Offenders
and Excluding Them From Execution, 30 J. LEoIs. 77, 98-99 (2003). Compare Bill Analysis,
S. 3, 2003-2004 Sess. (Cal. 2003), with Bill Analysis, S. 51, 2003-2004 Sess. (Cal. 2003)
(suggesting a determination of mental retardation without consideration of the facts of the case
at one time and then omitting such a suggestion in subsequent analysis, while reiterating that
mental retardation determinations require an "historic view" of the individual's life).
153 William Lee Hon, Feature: Expert Witness, Claims of Mental Retardation in Capital
Litigation, 69(8) TEX. B. J. 742, 743-44 (Sept. 2006).
154 Id. at 744.
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ing the significance of expert testimony on mental retardation, the author
concludes that, "in many instances the facts of the crime will be the best
evidence of a defendant's level of adaptive functioning." 55
In one prominent case, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
relied predominantly on crime evidence in its adaptive behavior assess-
ment. 156 The court rejected the results for Vineland and Independent
Living Scale test scores of two standard deviations below the mean be-
cause it questioned whether the standardized measures could measure
someone like the petitioner who was raised in Vietnam, spoke little to no
English, and had been incarcerated for more than ten years before the
tests were administered. 157 The court also rejected expert testimony that
the defendant had deficits in five of the ten DSM-IV skill areas.' 58 In-
stead, the court relied solely on the facts of the crime to support its find-
ing that the defendant did not suffer from significant limitations in
adaptive behavior. The court explained:
In the legal setting, the court must not become so entan-
gled with the opinions of psychiatric experts that we lose
sight of the nature of the criminal offense itself. We
must also not turn a blind eye to the defendant's ability
to use society to better his needs. There are mentally
retarded persons who are criminals, but they tend to
commit fairly primitive crimes, impulsive crimes, and
sudden acts of violence. The more complex the crime,
however, the less likely that the person is mentally re-
tarded. Thus, the court cannot forget to examine the na-
ture of the criminal conduct and the circumstances
155 Id. (emphasis added) ("Notwithstanding expert testimony to the contrary, juries are
eminently capable of resolving the subjective mental retardation issue when furnished with all
relevant evidence of the defendant's life, background, and criminal and mental health
histories.").
156 See Van Tran v. State, No. W2005-01334-CCA-R3-PD, 2006 WL 3327828 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Nov. 9, 2006). The post-conviction petitioner presented the results of two stan-
dardized adaptive behavior tests (Independent Living Scales and Vineland) on which the peti-
tioner scored more than two standard deviations below the mean. Id. at *5, * 10. These scores
met the criteria for significant deficits in adaptive behavior under the AAMR. Id. at *7, *10.
A psychologist specializing in neuropsychology, who administered additional tests, found that
the post-conviction petitioner had deficits in frontal lobe functioning, deficits in language and
verbal communication, in memory, and in motor speed, all of which would negatively impact
his adaptive functioning. Id. at *8. She found that the petitioner showed limitations in five of
the DSM-IV-TR skill areas (language-communication; functional academics; conceptual rea-
soning; health and safety; and social and interpersonal skills) and overall limitations in at least
one of the three AAMR skill areas (conceptual). Id. at *1 i. The expert also described envi-
ronmental risk factors that contributed to the petitioner's deficits. Id.
157 See id. at *15-16.
158 See id. at *23, 25.
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involved in that conduct when determining whether a
person is mentally retarded. 59
Within this passage are traces of stereotype ("there are mentally re-
tarded persons who are criminals, but they tend to commit fairly primi-
tive crimes, impulsive crimes, and sudden acts of violence") and a focus
on strengths regardless of weaknesses ("the more complex the crime...
the less likely that the person is mentally retarded"). Finally, despite
acknowledging skill areas and recognizing that a defendant need only
show significant limitations in one or two, the court also applied the
Briseno factors.160 The result was a mdlange in which the court ulti-
mately relied on nothing but the circumstances of the crime:
The circumstances of the Petitioner's crime belie any as-
sertion that the Petitioner suffered from any deficit in
intellectual ability or adaptive skills. The Petitioner had
previously been employed by the victims of his crime.
He knew the layout of the restaurant and knew that jew-
elry was kept on the premises. The Petitioner did the
talking with one of the victims at the onset of the crime.
The Petitioner was the person that went into the office to
collect the jewelry. After the crime, the Petitioner es-
caped with two of his co-defendants to Houston, Texas,
where it was the Petitioner who arranged to sell the jew-
elry to a Vietnamese man for $4,000. It was also the
Petitioner who paid this man from the proceeds and di-
vided the money with his two co-defendants. The Peti-
tioner's active participation and planning in the offense
is the "opposite end of the spectrum from [the] behavior
of mentally retarded offenders."1 61
The implication that crime evidence can override the other evidence
regarding mental retardation because it is the "best evidence" of adaptive
functioning must be rejected. There are several reasons for this. One
reason courts should "avoid basing diagnostic inferences about a defen-
dant's level of adaptive functioning, and about having MR, on informa-
tion about his or her past criminal acts" is that "not enough information
is typically available (on a precise microlevel) regarding the exact situa-
tional demands and the level of cognitive skills required to navigate
those demands."' 62 For example, "we do not typically know . . . the
159 Id. at *24-25.
160 See id. at *23-24.
161 Id. at *23 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319-20).
162 Greenspan & Switzky, supra note 139, at 291; see Everington & Olley, supra note 71,
at 11 ("[M]ost important, adaptive behavior is the individual's typical performance in his/her
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extent to which the defendant may have been coached and trained by a
less impaired 'robbery coach,' as opposed to figuring out these things for
himself." 163 Further, "when establishing standards for assessment of
adaptive skills, it is important to note that maladaptive skills should not
be used as indications of adaptive deficits" because "some items that are
associated with maladaptive behavior, such as social behavior, are actu-
ally adaptive skills areas that are important to establishing adaptive skills
deficits."1 64
Additionally, because the focus must be on the specific areas of
adaptive functioning identified by the clinical definitions, 65 the rele-
vance of crime facts to the diagnosis depends on a variety of factors. For
example, it depends on what evidence of adaptive limitations the defen-
dant presents and the extent to which the crime facts offset that evidence.
Evidence of the crime, like any evidence offered by the prosecution, is
only relevant to the mental retardation determination if it corresponds to
a skill in which the defense has presented evidence of a deficit. 66 In
Lambert, the prosecution emphasized the crime's circumstances, which
showed that the defendant could drive, give and understand directions,
and use a weapon. 167 But as the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
astutely recognized, "[n]one of the evidence of criminal activity went to
any of Lambert's claims of adaptive function limitations." 168 Therefore,
"none of it was relevant."' 69
In Holladay, the prosecution argued that the crime facts were the
strongest evidence of the absence of adaptive functioning limitations.
The court, having found that the defendant had deficits in conceptual,
social, and practical skills, recognized that "[t]he main legal/medical is-
sue in this case may be whether the ability to commit a crime and tempo-
rarily avoid capture forecloses a determination of mental retardation."'170
The court, however, was "at a loss to see which of the ten factors this
bears on. It would appear that such criminal conduct would indicate at
community setting. The details of the crime cannot be considered to be a sample of typical
behavior.").
163 Greenspan & Switzky, supra note 139, at 291.
164 Everington & Olley, supra note 71, at 11 ("The distinction between adaptive skills and
maladaptive behavior is particularly germane to criminal justice cases where there is a ten-
dency to use the facts of the crime as evidence of adaptive skills.").
165 See Young et al., supra note 146, at 173; Everington & Olley, supra note 71, at 11.
166 See Lambert v. State, 126 P.3d 646, 651 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005). Similarly, the
causation of an individual's adaptive functioning deficits does not negate the diagnosis of
mental retardation when deficits are present.
167 Id. at 656.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Holladay v. Campbell, 463 F.Supp.2d 1324, 1346 (N.D. Ala. 2006).
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least social limitations." 171 The Holladay court noted that the Atkins
court, rather than finding that the heinous facts of the crime refuted
mental retardation, saw the defendant's criminal and impulsive behavior
as potentially indicative of adaptive behavior limitations and conse-
quently reduced culpability.1 72 The Atkins majority also recognized that
"[t]here is no evidence that [people with mental retardation] are more
likely to engage in criminal conduct than others."t 173 Perhaps most im-
portant, as with prison evidence, courts should be cautious of crime evi-
dence and measure its value according to the level of detail with which
the behavior and events alleged to represent adaptive abilities are
explained.
In sum, in assessing criminal conduct including the facts of the
crime, courts must ask what relevance criminal conduct has to the adap-
tive behavior determination. This requires careful consideration of
whether the stressed strengths involved in the criminal activity actually
correlate to the asserted deficits and the level of detail of adaptive limita-
tions provided by the defendant's evidence. Courts must also ensure that
strengths are not wrongly given dispositive weight by careless use of
stereotype.
E. Mental Retardation and Mental Disorders Coexist
Fortunately for Jeffrey Williams, the courts did not look incorrectly
to prison behavior or crime evidence. The courts did, however, make
another error by positing a false dichotomy between mental retardation
and mental disorders. State and federal courts approach mental disorders
and mental retardation differently. 174 In Williams's case, the courts dis-
tinguished evidence as explained by mental retardation or another disor-
171 Id.; see also Holladay v. Allen, 555 F.3d 1346, 1363 (11 th Cir. 2009) (recognizing
that defense expert's testimony "cogently explained Holladay's strengths with regard to the
events of the crime but also explained that some of what Alabama points to as strengths are
activities that an individual with mild mental retardation is capable of performing").
172 See Holladay v. Campbell, 463 F.Supp.2d 1324, 1346-47. This has long been recog-
nized in the field: "[Aldaptive behavior is a term of art, which is not synonymous with mal-
adaptive behavior." Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 84, at 421-23. In their Atkins dissents,
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for allowing committers of
brutal and heinous crimes to avoid the death penalty. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321-37 (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 337-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Atkins, for example, had sixteen
prior felony convictions and shot the victim in the case eight times. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at
307.; cf Rivera v. Dretke, No. Civ. B-03-139, 2006 WL 870927, at *25 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31,
2006) (finding mental retardation despite a finding by the court that "[t]he underlying crime
for which Rivera was given the death penalty is one of the most senseless and brutal crimes
that this Court has ever encountered").
173 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002). Learning disabilities and inclination to
impulsive behavior, the Court recognized, also enhanced the risk that offenders with mental
retardation will not receive a fair and individualized sentencing proceeding. See id. at 306-07.
174 Compare Lambert v. State, 126 P.3d 646, 659 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) with Briseno
v. Dretke, No. L-05-08, 2007 WL 998743, at *14 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2007).
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der-antisocial personality disorder-but not both. The courts described
what Williams presented as evidence of adaptive deficits as "bizarre and
antisocial conduct," evincing characteristics that "are just as easily seen
as attention-getting behaviors as they are evidence of mental retardation"
and "could be explained by anti-social personality rather than mental
retardation."1 75 The Briseno court accepted the same dichotomy, and
cited it as a motivating reason for the need to enunciate its novel addi-
tional evidentiary factors. 176 These approaches are contrary to accepted
clinical practice. 177
It is well recognized by clinical professionals that mental retardation
and mental disorders coexist, 178 and may even be interrelated. 179 The
characteristics that the Court identified in Atkins that make defendants
with mental retardation less culpable-diminished capacities to under-
stand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mis-
takes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others t 80-overlap
with the criteria for some mental illnesses.181 Accordingly, "[wihen a
defendant's behavior, whether criminal or other, is associated with cer-
175 Williams v. Quarterman, 293 Fed.Appx. 298, 312 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting district
court holding) (emphasis added).
176 See Briseno, 2007 WL 998743, at *14.
177 See, e.g., Green v. Johnson, No. CIVA 2:05CV340, 2006 WL 3746138, at *59 (E.D.
Va. Dec. 15, 2006); see also Simpson v. Quarterman, No. 1:04-CV-485, 2007 WL 1008193, at
*15 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2007) (citing Exparte Simpson, 136 S.W.3d 600, 664-65 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000)). For more recent examples, see Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008) (finding no adaptive behavior deficits where experts diagnosed the defendant with con-
duct disorder and antisocial personality rather than MR). But cf Brumsfield v. Cain, Civil
Action No. 04-787-JJB-CN, 2008 WL 2600140 (M.D. La. June 30, 2008) (affirming reasona-
bleness of trial court determination based on evidence before the trial court, but granting evi-
dentiary hearing based on new evidence related to "risk factors" for mental retardation-
family history of mental retardation, low birth weight, mother's use of drugs during preg-
nancy, abuse).
178 See AAIDD 10th ed., supra note 5, at 15 ("In general, mental health disorders are
more prevalent among individuals with MRID than the general population."); HANDBOOK OF
MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE MENTALLY RETARDED (Frank J. Menolascino & Jack A. Stark eds.,
1984).
179 See Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 27 at 304-08; see also Holladay v. Campbell 463
F.Supp.2d 1324, 1344, 1346 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (referring to Appendix B).
180 See Atkins v. United States, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).
181 See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 706. Characteristics of mental retardation overlap,
for example, with the diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder, which is defined by
factors including "failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indi-
cated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest"; "impulsivity or failure to plan
ahead"; "consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work
behavior or honor financial obligations"; and "lack of remorse, as indicated by being indiffer-
ent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another .... See Irving Phillips
& Nancy Williams, Psychopathology and Mental Retardation: A Study of 100 Mentally Re-
tarded Children, 132 Am. J. PsYcHIATRY 1265 (1975) (finding in study of 100 children with
mental retardation, that the largest categories of co-morbidity were behavioral disorders, fol-
lowed closely by personality disorders).
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tain characteristics (such as impulsivity, recklessness, or low frustration
tolerance), it can be difficult to determine whether the behavior is attribu-
table to mental retardation, antisocial personality disorder, some combi-
nation of both, or another diagnostic issue entirely (e.g., substance use,
neurological impairment, other mental illness)."1 82 "[F]or example, an
individual might have adapted to institutional social norms by develop-
ing dependent features or aspects of Antisocial Personality Disorder as a
result of oppositional behavior."18 3
Using a clinical approach, a diagnosis of mental retardation is mul-
tifactorial. In Lambert and Holladay, the courts were able to dispel the
false dichotomy. In Lambert, accepting the existence of deficits in four
skill areas, the State argued that the defendant did not have mental retar-
dation because his limitations were better described by, of caused by,
antisocial personality disorder, schizophrenia, conduct disorder, and drug
abuse. 184 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed this argu-
ment, finding that "[a]n alternative explanation for an agreed condition is
not a negation of that condition."' 85 The court went farther, taking issue
with the relevance of the State's evidence concerning the diagnoses and
the drug use.1 86 Because in the court's view neither the drug abuse evi-
182 Young et al., supra note 146, at 173. See also Fabian, supra note 47, at 27 ("Adap-
tive issues such as poor social skills, gullibility, reckless and antisocial behaviors may be due
to both adaptive functioning deficits pursuant to mental retardation as well as other psychiatric
disorders.").
183 WILLIAM R. LINDSAY ET AL., MENTAL HEALTH ASPECTS OF MENTAL RETARDATION:
PROGRESS IN ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT 314-17 (2007). See Lawrence Dana, Personality
Disorder in Persons with Mental Retardation: Assessment and Diagnosis, in MENTAL HEALTH
ASPECTS OF MENTAL RETARDATION: PROGRESS IN ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT 130, 131
(Robert J. Fletcher & Anton Dosen eds.) (1993) (noting "link between depressed mood, low
social support, and poor social skills was found among mildly retarded persons[,] further found
to be associated with inept social interactions [which are] among the key diagnostic criteria for
personality disorders"); id. at 153 (noting that antisocial personality disorder is one of the six
personality disorders that exists most often among individuals with mental retardation); see
also Jessica Moreland et al., The Validity of a Personality Disorder Diagnosis for People with
an Intellectual Disability, 21 J. OF APPLIED RES. IN INTELL. DISABLImES 219, 220 (2008) ("It
is clear that for people with severe disabilities whose communication is impaired, the inability
to make their needs known is likely to increase the probability of [challenging] behaviours.");
Louise F. Eaton & Frank J. Menolascino, Psychiatric Disorders in the Mentally Retarded:
Types, Problems, and Challenges, 139 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1297 (1982) (studying 114 commu-
nity-based individuals diagnosed as having both mental illness and mental retardation and
finding that 27.1% of the subjects had personality disorders); John M. Fabian, State Supreme
Court Responses to Atkins v. Virginia: Adaptive Functioning Assessment in Light of Pur-
poseful Planning, Premeditation, and the Behavioral Context of the Homicide, 6(4) J. FOREN-
SIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 1, 14 (2006) ("[S]ome offenders may have both antisocial personality
traits and mild mental retardation ....").
184 See Lambert v. State, 126 F.3d 646, 652-53, 655, 659 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005).
185 Id. at 653. Regarding drug abuse, the Lambert court specifically noted that because
"[m]ental retardation is a condition present at birth ... subsequent drug abuse makes it no
more nor less likely." Id. at 655.
186 Id. at 659.
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dence nor the evidence concerning mental disorders offset the alleged
limitations, it was irrelevant to the mental retardation determination and
improperly admitted.187 Holladay reached the same conclusion, faulting
the prosecution's expert for "look[ing] upon inappropriate conduct as
something separate from mental retardation, rather than as indicating a
lack of support which has impeded adaptation."' 88 The Holladay court's
finding that an adverse home environment (parental physical abuse, alco-
holism of parents) may have contributed to mental retardation under-
scores the importance, stressed in the clinical definitions, of identifying
environmental risk factors and supports or lack thereof as a means of
diagnosing mental retardation.
When dual diagnoses are appropriate there is always a risk of "diag-
nostic overshadowing," or "under-recognition of intellectual impairments
among individuals with depression, psychosis, or anxiety disorders."' 189
A defendant seeking to prove adaptive functioning deficits, therefore, "is
not required to show that mental retardation is the cause of his limitations
in certain skill areas." 190 The test is between the individual and their
environment: if the individual functions at a significantly deficient level
in certain skills, they have mental retardation, regardless of the etiology
of their limitations. As the DSM-IV-TR states, "the diagnosis shall be
made whenever the diagnostic criteria are met, regardless of and in addi-
tion to the presence of another disorder."' 191 "The diagnostic criteria for
Mental Retardation do not include an exclusion criterion."'192
187 See id.; accord Rivera v. Dretke, 2006 WL 870927 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2006).
188 Holladay v. United States, 463 F.Supp.2d 1324, 1343 (N.D. Ala. 2006); see id. at 1345
("This court rejects the argument that willful and antisocial behavior excludes a mental retar-
dation determination. To the contrary, it suggests that a person whose IQ tests strongly indi-
cate mental retardation has not adapted.").
189 AAIDD 10th ed., supra note 5, at 16; see also Steven Reiss & J. Szyszko, Diagnostic
Overshadowing and Professional Experience with Mentally Retarded Persons, 87 AM. J.
MENTAL DEFICIENCY 396 (1983).
190 Lambert v. State, 126 P.3d 646, 651 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005); see also Rivera, 2006
WL 870927. Indeed, "[m]ental retardation has many different etiologies and may be seen as a
final common pathway of various pathological processes that affect the functioning of the
central nervous system." DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41. The major predisposing factors
include: "heredity[;] early alterations of embryonic development[;] environmental influ-
ences[;] mental disorders[;] pregnancy and perinatal problems[;] [and] general medical condi-
tions acquired in infancy or childhood." Id. at 45-46.
191 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 47; see also id. at 42 ("Adaptive functioning may be
influenced by various factors, including education, motivation, personality characteristics, so-
cial or vocational opportunities, and the mental disorders and general medical conditions that
may coexist with mental retardation."); id. at 45 ("Individuals with mental retardation have a
prevalence of comorbid mental disorder that is estimated to be three to four times greater than
in the general population."); id. at 44 (stating that an individual may have mental retardation
with another mental disorder or with a general medical disorder (e.g., Downs syndrome)).
192 Id. at 47.
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It may seem wrong for self-induced causes, such that the defendant
is in part or in whole responsible for the limitation, to support a diagnosis
of mental retardation. In Rivera v. Dretke, the court could not identify
particular causes of the functioning deficits, finding it "impossible in
hindsight to separate out what may be 'true' mental retardation (existing
before age of eighteen) from whatever damage Rivera may have done to
himself from his continual use of inhalants, cocaine, and marijuana." 193
Finding the defendant had mental retardation, the court was nevertheless
"troubled by the notion that one can 'fry' his own brain by using illegal
drugs and then be excused from some of the possible consequences of
committing a gruesome and murderous act." 194 But the rationale of At-
kins is not that mental retardation absolves a defendant of criminal re-
sponsibility; rather, it lessens his moral culpability to a level where the
death penalty is no longer an appropriate punishment. The court recog-
nized that it was compelled under Atkins to accept that the cause of the
subaverage functioning was not dispositive to the mental retardation
determination. 195
The bottom line with regard to evidence of concurrent or contribu-
tory disorders is that circumstances, both present and historical, can
make significantly subaverage functioning more or less likely.196 But a
dual diagnosis or evidence of a contributory cause does not negate the
possibility of the presence of mental retardation. A defendant need not
disprove an antisocial personality disorder diagnosis to prove mental re-
tardation. If the defendant has adaptive limitations-even if evinced by
characteristics that overlap with conduct disorder-and the requisite in-
tellectual limitations, he may have mental retardation even if other diag-
noses apply.
IV. THE NOVEL "ONSET" PREREQUISITE APPLIED TO
MICHAEL STALLINGS
The third criterion for establishing mental retardation under the
clinical definitions is evidence of development of the functional limita-
tions associated with mental retardation before the subject is eighteen
years of age. The clinical definitions neither specify nor require that evi-
dence of onset be established by a standardized instrument testing intelli-
gence or adaptive behavior.197 Most often, individuals with mental
retardation have not taken standardized assessments of intelligence or
193 Rivera, 2006 WL 870927, at *24, *26.
194 Id. at *23.
195 See id. at *23 n.55.
196 See Holladay v. United States, 463 F.Supp.2d 1324, 1345 (N.D. Ala. 2006) ("It is
obvious that negative influences such as parental physical abuse, excessive drinking of alco-
hol, etc. can have a negative effect [on adaptive functioning].").
197 See Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 27, at 855.
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adaptive functioning prior to the age of eighteen. Often, despite indica-
tions of mental retardation, tests are not performed for charitable reasons,
for instance where institutions do not want to stigmatize a child, or finan-
cial reasons, if institutions do not want to pay benefits or have responsi-
bility. This may be particularly true in schools or other institutions
serving lower socioeconomic neighborhoods.1 98 In some districts IQ
testing has been forbidden for race discrimination reasons. Some foreign
nationals may not have grown up in an environment where standardized
intelligence testing was available. The AAIDD recognizes this, identify-
ing "[a] number of reasons [that] might explain the lack of an earlier,
official diagnosis of mental retardation":
* the individual was excluded from a full school
experience;
" the person's age precluded his or her involvement in
specialized services such as special education
programs;
" the person was given no diagnosis or a different diag-
nosis for 'political purposes,' such as protection from
stigma or teasing, avoidance of assertions of discrim-
ination, or related to conclusions about the potential
benefits or dangers of a particular diagnosis;
* the school's concern about over-representation for
data reporting purposes of specific diagnostic groups
within their student population;
" parental concerns about labels;
* contextual school-based issues such as availability or
nonavailability of services and potential funding
streams at that time; and
* the lack of entry referral into the diagnostic referral
process due to cultural and linguistic differences.1 99
The AAIDD also states, specifically with respect to criminal pro-
ceedings, that "some criminal defendants fall at the upper end of the MR/
ID severity continuum (i.e., people with mental retardation who have a
higher IQ) and frequently ...have a history of academic failure and
marginal social and vocational skills [and] their previous and current sit-
uations frequently allowed formal assessment to be avoided or led to
assessment that was less than optimal. '200
198 See id. ("Such a requirement would be unconstitutional because it would amount to
discrimination against people whose need for special education was overlooked and who did
not have access to adequate clinical or social services as a child.").
199 AAIDD 10th ed., supra note 5, at 18.
200 Id.
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Michael Stallings was one such defendant. The Ohio courts ac-
cepted that Stallings presented IQ test scores and evidence of adaptive
functioning limitations sufficient to satisfy the first two prongs of the
clinical definitions, but denied his Atkins claim for lack of evidence of
onset, based on the testimony of Stallings's own experts. 20 1 When asked
about onset, one expert testified that as a child, Stallings was described
by family members, teachers, and mental health professionals as having
characteristics associated with mental retardation, namely, that he was
concrete-thinking, impulsive, immature, a follower, did not understand
personal relationships, and had difficulty adjusting to new situations. 202
The expert also noted that Stallings was in "special education classes and
developmental handicapped classes. '20 3  The expert concluded that,
based on this information, he could not "rule out mental retardation, al-
though he could not state with 100 percent certainty that Stallings was
mentally retarded. '204 A second expert concurred. Acknowledging
"there was no actual testing for mental retardation ... prior to age 18,"
the expert stated that Stallings's "school records and family reports sup-
port the conclusion that his functional limitations and severity were not
new. '20 5 The court was unimpressed with this testimony because neither
expert would "definitely conclude" that onset preceded Stallings's eight-
eenth birthday; in the court's view neither expert said that Stallings had
mental retardation, "only that it is possible. '20 6 Stallings is not the only
capital defendant whose Atkins claim was wrongly denied for failure to
present "concrete evidence" of onset in the form of standardized
testing. 207
While the Ohio Supreme Court recently reversed an Ohio trial
court's decision that a defendant failed to establish mental retardation
simply due to the lack of a standardized test prior to eighteen, correctly
holding that evidence of onset of adaptive functioning limitations prior to
eighteen does not necessarily have to be proven by standardized test,20 8
201 See Stallings v. Bagley, 561 F.Supp.2d 821, 883-84 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
202 Id. at 882.
203 Id.
204 Id. (quoting Trial Transcript).
205 Id. at 883.
206 Id. at 884.
207 See, e.g., Rosales v. Quarterman, 291 Fed.Appx. 558 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting merits
of Atkins claim in part because petitioner failed to "present any concrete evidence of adaptive
behavioral deficits that had onset before the age of 18"); see also Pizzuto v. State, 202 P.3d
642 (Idaho 2008) (finding that lack of pre-18 IQ test in combination with present seizure
disorder provides reasonable basis to infer lack of pre- 18 onset and that IQ decreasing and MR
increasing over time).
208 See State v. White, 885 N.E.2d 905, 917 (Ohio 2008); see id. at 916 ("Although White
had taken neither an IQ test nor an adaptive-skills test before age 18, Drs. Hammer and Fabian
were able to review White's academic records. These records strongly support the experts'
conclusion that White's intellectual and adaptive deficits had their onset before age 18."). The
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Stallings was not so fortunate. And the state courts' demands for "defi-
nite proof' of onset in the form of a standardized test posed additional
problems for him in the federal habeas context. Even if a federal court
agrees that no proof of standardized testing is necessary to establish on-
set, it may find that a state court was not "unreasonable" in dismissing a
mental retardation claim on that basis. In Stallings v. Bagley, a Northern
District of Ohio judge did just that. While the federal district court ex-
pressly disagreed with the state court's demand for "definite proof' of
pre-eighteen onset in the form of a standardized test, the court, "reluc-
tantly," was not ready to say that the state court's demand was an objec-
tively unreasonable interpretation of Atkins.209
CONCLUSION
The title of this article refers to John Steinbeck's famous novella OF
MICE AND MEN, which tells the story of two depression-era wandering
farmhands, George and his mentally retarded sidekick Lenny.210 Both
dream of getting their own little farm and living "off the fat of the land."
But the dream dies hard when Lenny kills the young, flirtatious wife of a
ranch owner's son, and George, in turn, kills Lenny to prevent him from
being lynched or tried for murder. Steinbeck leaves the reader with no
doubt that Lenny-because of his mental retardation-is not fully re-
sponsible for what he has done, and that George-faced with impossible,
unjust alternatives-does the best he can.
Atkins v. Virginia promises to end the injustice of executing the
Lennys of the world. But after reading the post-Atkins cases, it is not
clear that George would have any better choices today. Imagine if
Lenny's lawyer claimed that his client was not eligible for execution be-
cause he was a person with mental retardation, and was faced with the
state glosses on the definition of mental retardation we have described.
It is surprisingly easy to write the state court's decision rejecting Lenny's
claim:
Lenny Small claims he is mentally retarded and thus in-
eligible for execution under Atkins v. Virginia. We disa-
gree. While Smalls may have satisfied the first prong
(substantially subaverage intellectual functioning), his
claim fails on both the second and third prongs. First, as
for the adaptive functioning prong, the evidence revealed
that Small, when he wanted to, was able to obtain em-
ployment at a number of different agricultural busi-
court properly looked to White's grades in school, his achievement test scores, and the defi-
ciencies indicated there corroborated by interviews with family members.
209 See Stallings v. Bagley, 561 F.Supp.2d 821, 884-85 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
210 See STEINBECK, supra note *.
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nesses. Various employers described him as a hard
worker who understood their instructions and was able
to successfully perform a variety of tasks. Additionally,
the crime is inconsistent with mental retardation. After
committing the murder, Small went to great lengths to
conceal his crime, including hiding the body. Finally,
we credit the testimony of the State's expert that the def-
icits in adaptive functioning (Small's inconsistent work
history, lack of close relationships, dropping out of
school, etc.) relied upon by Small's experts are better
explained by antisocial personality disorder than mental
retardation. Small also cannot satisfy the third prong
(onset before age 18), as he has not produced any evi-
dence of IQ tests prior to the age of 18, or that he was
ever placed in special education classes, or deemed by
any school or agency to be a person with mental
retardation.
The understanding of mental retardation reflected in this hypotheti-
cal opinion, like the understanding in many post-Atkins decisions, is at
odds with the clinical definitions of mental retardation. It is also incon-
sistent with the "evolving standards of decency" 211 that Atkins holds
have brought our society beyond the compounded tragedies portrayed so
many years ago in OF MICE AND MEN.
211 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002).
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